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I. INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, the victorious western Allies sought to establish
multilateral international institutions to address root causes of the Second
World War and of the Great Depression that had preceded it. To this end,
they conceived of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and the International Trade Organization (ITO). These institutions were to
administer, respectively, international political, financial, and trade relations.
Unlike the United Nations and IMF, however, the ITO never materialized
because postwar governments, including the United States, did not ratify its
founding instrument. Consequently, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT),' which those governments intended to be an interim
arrangement under the administration of the ITO, still governs much of
international trade relations.2
The GATT itself, however, was also never officially ratified as a
multilateral treaty. Instead, the legal basis for the GATT is an agreement
known as the Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA),3 which was intended
to permit the implementation of GATT obligations until the ITO came into
being. With the failure of the ITO, the PPA became the de facto permanent
basis of the GATT.4 The GATT grew incrementally with the addition of a
secretariat in the late 1940s, initially "leased" from the commission that had
been set up in preparation for the creation of the ITO; amendments in the
1950s to make the GATT more workable in the absence of the ITO; and the
subsequent addition of an Executive Secretary and periodic "rounds" of tariff
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187, 194 [hereinafter GATT].
2. P.W. BERNT & M.B.H. WEISS, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 104 (1993); WILFRED
J. ETHIER, MODERN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 227-33 (1983); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 30-39 (1989) [hereinafter
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING]; ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD
IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 141-50 (1984); MONOPOLKOMMISSION, HAUPTGUTACHTEN IX
1990/1991: WETTBEwERBsPOLITIK ODER INDUSTRIEPOLITIK, para. 1138 (1992); JOSEPH E. PATTISON,
ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS § 1.05[1], at 1-18 (1993); JOAN E. SPERO, THE
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 95-99 (3d ed. 1985); Ronald A. Brand, GATT and
the Evolution of United States Trade Law, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 101, 117-20 (1992); Robert N.H.
Christmas, The GATT and Services: Quill and Ink in an Age of Word Processors?, 10 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 288, 288-89 (1986); William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 51,
52 n.1 (1987); John H. Jackson, GATTand Recent International Trade Problems, 11 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 1, 7-9 (1987) [hereinafter Jackson, Recent Problems]; John H. Jackson, GATT and the Future of
International Trade Institutions, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 11, 15-17 (1992) [hereinafter Jackson, Future
Institutions]; Lisa S. Klaiman, Applying GA 7T Dispute Settlement Procedures to a Trade in Services
Agreement: Proceed with Caution, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 657, 657 n.2 (1990); Robert A. Pollard
& Samuel F. Wells, Jr., 1945-1960: The Era of American Economic Hegemony, in ECONOMICS AND
WORLD POWER 333, 333-36 (William H. Becker & Samuel F. Wells, Jr. eds., 1984).
3. Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
4. Since the U.S. Congress never ratified the GATT, its status under U.S. law is that of an Executive
Agreement. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 32-37; Brand, supra note 2, at 119-120.
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reduction negotiations.'
An ad hoc quality still characterizes regulation and liberalization of
international trade relations. This is particularly true with respect to
international trade in services, as the GATT applies only to trade in goods.6
The Group of Negotiations on Services (GNS), conducted in parallel with the
recently concluded Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, does, however,
now attempt to extend the GATT approach to services sectors. 7 Despite the
overwhelming importance of services to the gross national product (GNP) and
trade of the United States and its similarly situated trading partners, the first
round of negotiations for multilateral international services trade liberalization
concluded only on December 15, 1993, when the GNS produced a final draft
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),8 which will take
effect in 1995 upon ratification by its eighty-eight participating governments. 9
Future rounds of services trade negotiations are expected to occur in the year
2000 and "periodically thereafter.""
The United States and its services industries have a strong interest in
pursuing and achieving further international services trade liberalization.
While the intentions and principles of the GATT-based approach of the GNS
are laudable, the inherent flaws of this approach and its failure to distinguish
between goods and services suggest that it will not yield optimum results
within a reasonable time frame. However, this Article does not present a
protectionist argument or propose abandonment of GNS efforts. Rather, it
suggests that other avenues for pursuing services trade liberalization may yield
more immediate and tangible results.
Drawing on examples from typical internationally traded services such as
air transport and telecommunications, Part II of this Article defines services
5. BERNr & WEISS, supra note 2, at 104; JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 37-39;
SPERO, supra note 2, at 94-99; KEOHANE, supra note 2, at 147-48.
6. The preamble to the GATT recites goals of the agreement, which include "expanding the
production and exchange of goods." Services are not mentioned. GATT, supra note 1, pmbl.; see also
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 42; MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1143;
SPERO, supra note 2, at 101; Terrence G. Berg, Trade in Services: Toward a "Development Round" of
GATTNegotiations Benefitting Both Developing and Industrialized Nations, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 n.8
(1987); Christmas, supra note 2, at 288; Phillip H. Gold, Legal Problems in Expanding the Scope of GAIT
to Include Trade in Services, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J. 281 (1982); Klaiman, supra note 2, at 659; Phedon
Nicolaides, Economic Aspects of Services: Implications for a GATTAgreement, 23 J. WORLD TRADE L.
125, 125 (1989); Richard Rivers et al., Putting Services on the Table: The New GATT Round, 23 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 13, 14-15 (1987); Jeffrey Schott & Jacqueline Mazza, Trade in Services and Developing
Countries, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 253, 265 (1986); Elaine M. Whitford, A Rainy Day for the GAIT
Umbrella: Trade Negotiations on Services, 14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMP. REG. 121 (1989).
7. See infra text accompanying note 167.
8. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44 [hereinafter GATS]; see
David Dodwell & Lionel Barber, World Trade Deal Is Cleared: GATT Chief Brings Down the Gavel on
Historic Market Liberallsation Accord, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 1993, at 1; David Dodwell, Slender Success
in Attacking Barriers: Services, FIN. TaEs, Dec. 16, 1993, at 4.
9. Dodwell & Barber, supra note 8, at 1; Martin Wolf, Doing Good, Despite Themselves, FIN.
TIMEs, Dec. 16, 1993, at 15.
10. GATS, supra note 8, pt. IV; see Frances Williams, Never Again, Vow Weary Negotiators, FIN.
TIMEs, Dec. 16, 1993, at 7.
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and distinguishes them from goods so as to provide a basis for evaluating
different approaches to services trade liberalization. Part III examines the
obligations and attributes of the GATT-based approach to determine whether
it is appropriate for services sectors. Some of the criticisms of the GATT
posed here apply equally well to goods sectors. Owing to the inherent
drawbacks to the GATT-based approach and the economic differences between
goods and services, Part IV proposes an alternative approach for pursuing
services trade liberalization.
II. SIGNIFICANCE AND DEFINITION OF SERVICES
Four attributes distinguish services from goods. In empirical terms,
services are by far the dominant component of the GNP of developed
countries such as the United States and are a major component of international
trade. In theoretical economic terms, services are intangible processes that are
traded via interaction between producers and consumers in cross-border
movements of capital assets or personnel. They are also subject to extensive
government regulation and are extremely difficult to measure. The following
sections consider each of these attributes.
A. Significance of Services
Services are a major component of international trade and, at least for
developed countries, the dominant component of the national economy. In the
late 1980s, services industries contributed over two-thirds of the national
product of the United States and other developed countries." Only about
40% of the national product of less developed countries (LDCs) has been
attributed to services industries.1 2 Services industries employed about 70%
of U.S. workers in 1989, a figure that has risen steadily from 48% in
1948.3 Indeed, 86% of U.S. job growth between 1960 and 1985 occurred
11. Ronald A. Cass & Eli M. Noam, The Economics and Politics of Trade in Services, in RULES
FOR FREE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 43, 45 (Daniel Friedmann & Ernst-Joachim Mestmncker
eds., 1990) [hereinafter RULES]; see also SPERO, supra note 2, at 100; Steven F. Benz, Trade Liberaliza-
tion and the Global Service Economy, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 95, 97 (1985); Berg, supra note 6, at 6;
A.F. Ewing, Why Freer Trade in Services Is in the Interest of Developing Countries, 19 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 147, 149 (1985); Jackson, Future Institutions, supra note 2, at 11; Jackson, Recent Problems, supra
note 2, at 3; Marianna Maffucci, Liberalization of International Trade in the Services Sector: Threshold
Problems and a Proposed Framework Under the GA7T, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 371, 375-76 (1981);
Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 27; Schott & Mazza, supra note 6, at 254-58; Wealth in Services, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 20, 1993, at 15-16 [hereinafter Wealth].
12. Berg, supra note 6, at 15; Ewing, supra note 11, at 149; Schott & Mazza, supra note 6, at 254-
58.
13. This figure rises to 75% if one includes government services, although these are unlikely to be
internationally tradeable. BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, DAY OF RECKONING: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY 190 (1989); see also Gold, supra note 6, at 282; Klaiman, supra note 2,
at 668 n.79.
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in services industries. 14
Services production is also the most important of the export sectors of the
United States and other developed countries.'" U.S. services trade, for
instance, is estimated to have run a $60 billion surplus in 1992.6 In the past
ten years, the share of U.S. exports represented by services has risen from
20% to 30%."7 Empirical research even suggests that services may be less
sensitive than goods to cyclical downturns and may therefore provide a buffer
against recession.'"
While services represent the dominant component of the GNP and trade
of developed countries, they are less dominant in overall international trade.
Only about 20-25 % of international trade flows are attributable to services. 9
However, one estimate valued the cross-border services business in 1993 at
$900 billion and foreign operations of services companies at more than $3
trillion.2°
B. Services as Intangible Processes
Services are intangible processes that effect change, generally in the
condition or position, of goods and persons. 21 Services transactions "do not
normally involve transfers of property rights, nor do they 'exhaust' the
provider's 'stock' of services."' Since services are intangible, they are not
susceptible to transfer or storage, so production and consumption must occur
14. Benz, supra note 11, at 97.
15. Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 27; see also P.G.J. KAPTEYN & P.V. VAN THEMAAT,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 845 (1989) (noting that discussion of
services trade liberalization is "very important" to EC as well).
16. Jeffrey E. Garten, Clinton's Emerging Trade Policy: Act One, Scene One, FOREIGN AFF.,
Summer 1993, at 188.
17. Wealth, supra note 11, at 15.
18. Murray Gibbs, Continuing the International Debate on Services, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 199,
205 (1985).
19. Christmas, supra note 2, at 293; Jackson, Recent Problems, supra note 2, at 3; Klaiman, supra
note 2, at 668; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 13; Whitford, supra note 6, at 121. This figure is necessarily
approximate, given the difficulties in measuring services trade.
20. Dodwell & Barber, supra note 8, at 4.
21. For this definitional aspect of a service, see THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 400
(David Pearce ed., 1983); see also PHEDON NICOLAIDES, LIBERALIZING TRADE IN SERVICES 9 (1989);
KARL SAUvANT, INTERNATIONAL TRANsACIONs IN SERVICEs: THE POLrICS OF TRANSBORDER DATA
FLOWs 2 (1986); Jirgen Mfiller, An Economic Analysis of Different Regulatory Regimes of Transborder
Services, in RULEs, supra note 11, at 341, 344. By one view, "[a] service is a change in the condition of
a person or a good belonging to some economic unit, which results from the activity of another economic
unit, with the agreement of the former." E. WEISMAN, TRADE IN SERVICES AND IMPERFECT
COMPETITION: APPLICATION TO INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 41-42 (1990); see also Rachel McCulloch,
Services and the Uruguay Round, 13 WORLD ECON. 329, 335 (1990).
Financial services illustrate this definition. Financing, brokerage, advising, insurance, currency
exchange, and other financial services are themselves utterly intangible. They may be used, however, to
effect change in tangible goods and persons. Similarly, aviation services effect a change in the spatial
position of goods and persons. Unlike trade in the actual aircraft used to provide such service, the air
transport service itself is also intangible.
22. Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 126.
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simultaneously at the point of production.'
The need for simultaneous and direct interaction between services
consumers and producers is a key difference between goods and services
trade.24 Capital assets and personnel of services providers traverse
international borders to establish the contact necessary for services trade.'
The projection of capital assets across borders, either temporarily or via
foreign direct investment, is often an integral element of services trade.26
Local contracting may substitute for some cross-border movements of capital
assets required for services production. In other services industries, cross-
border movements of consumers may be a substitute. This will not always be
possible, however, and restrictions on the projection of assets will curtail the
competitive choices available to a services producer.
Similarly, cross-border movements of individuals may be fundamental to
services trade. Functions performed by personnel of services producers
include marketing, tailoring a product to customer specifications, providing
follow-up service or repairs, and providing the basic service itself.27 As with
cross-border projections of capital assets, it may be possible to substitute local
contracting for some direct factor movements. But likewise, restrictions on
movements of individuals may limit the competitiveness of a services
provider.
23. BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 98; SAUVANT, supra note 21, at 2; WEISMAN, supra note 21,
at 42; Wilfred J. Ethier & Henrik Horn, Services in International Trade, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
TRADE POLICY 223, 223 (Elhanan Helpman & Assaf Razin eds., 1991); McCulloch, supra note 21, at
335; Mfiller, supra note 21, at 344; Deepak Nayyar, Some Reflections on the Uruguay Round and Trade
in Services, 22 J. WORLD TRADE L. 35, 37 (1988) ("The producer and ... consumer must interact with
each other, so physical proximity is essential if an international service transaction is to take place.").
For instance, aviation services are not susceptible to storage for later consumption. Rather, a
passenger must be on board the aircraft of the service provider at precisely that instant at which the
transportation service is being performed in order to experience the relevant change in spatial condition.
Similarly, telecommunications services require a connection between the consumer wishing to transmit a
message and the network of the service provider at the moment when a communications link is needed.
24. Goods may be transmitted from the producer to the consumer via intermediaries, thereby
obviating the need for direct contact between the producer and consumer.
25. See GATS, supra note 8, art. 1(2) (defining trade in services). Stated in another way,
"international transactions... may be possible only if there is concomitant international movement of
production factors." Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 126.
26. Cass & Noam, supra note 11, at 50; Ethier & Horn, supra note 23, at 223; Maffucci, supra note
11, at 382-83; James Markusen, Trade in Producer Services and in Other Specialized Intermediate Inputs,
79 AM. ECON. REV. 85, 86 (1989); McCulloch, supra note 21, at 335; Ernst-Joachim Mestmgcker, Free
Trade in Services: Regional and Global Perspectives, in RULES, supra note 11, at 9, 13.
For instance, an airline must at least temporarily take productive assets - aircraft - into foreign
markets in order to provide the transportation service. An airline may also require longer-term local
commitments or investments such as maintenance facilities, offices, and airport space. Similarly, telecom-
munications services providers may require a satellite ground station or at least the right to transmit their
signals into foreign markets. See generally MONOPOLKOMMsSION, SONDERGUTrACHTEN 20: ZUR
NEUORDNUNG DER TELEKOMMUNIKATION (1991). Engineering or software services providers may require
local facilities for installation, follow-up service, or repairs. SAUVANT, supra note 21, at 4.
27. For instance, airlines must introduce personnel into foreign markets: pilots, cabin crews,
management, mechanics, and the like. Other services industries such as engineering, management
consulting, legal advice, information services, construction, and tourism similarly require the movement
of people and/or the establishment of a foreign presence. Markusen, supra note 26, at 86, 95.
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C. High Degree of Government Regulation
The cross-border projections of capital assets and individuals that
international trade in services usually entails often raise political concerns of
national autonomy and sovereignty, which in turn engender a high degree of
trade-inhibiting government regulation. Indeed, a high degree of government
regulation is another, if not the most important, characteristic of services. 2
Thus, international efforts to reign in national regulatory regimes would have
a profound impact in the services context.2
Governments enact restrictions on establishment, foreign direct invest-
ment, and international movements of individuals. Generally rigid immigration
regulations impede the international movement of persons and thus impede
international services trade by restricting the interaction of services providers
and consumers.30 In addition, governments directly regulate certain specific
services sectors because of their perceived political sensitivity. 1 Justifica-
tions for regulation include consumer protection, standards maintenance,
national security, prestige, cultural preservation, competition, immigration
control, financial prudence, environmental protection, employment,
development, and other political goals.32 While regulation of international
goods trade often only involves a simple percentage tariff on cross-border
goods shipments, regulatory schemes for services are usually highly technical,
detailed, and particular to each sector.
For example, in telecommunications services, comprehensive regulations
commonly determine which services may be offered, which companies may
compete in offering those services, and what rates they may charge.33
28. See Cass & Noam, supra note 11, at 61-62; see also WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 45 ("Perhaps
more important than a theoretical definition of services, one must note that regulation of services occurs
more frequently than regulation of goods."); Benz, supra note 11, at 96 ("[l1n most cases government
regulation of services activities are [sic] greater than exists in the situation of merchandise trade.");
Klaiman, supra note 2, at 673; Maffucci, supra note 11, at 383; McCulloch, supra note 21, at 342;
Mfiller, supra note 21, at 353-54.
29. Mestm~cker, supra note 26, at 20. Needless to say, the many local regulatory schemes in
existence are a serious impediment to international services trade. Mafficci, supra note 11, at 383-84;
Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 15.
30. Markusen, supra note 26, at 95; Mestmdcker, supra note 26, at 13; see, e.g., P.S. Randhawa,
Punta del Este and After: Negotiations on Trade in Services and the Uruguay Round, 21 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 163, 168 (1987) (noting complaints by Canada and Japan regarding "restrictive policies of the United
States toward foreign nationals entering the United States temporarily for legitimate commercial or pro-
fessional activities, or in renewing residence permits for engineers and the like, who were engaged in
after-sales services").
31. Berg, supra note 6, at 3; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 673. This rationale has been advanced to
justify direct regulation of major services industries such as telecommunications and information
transmission and dissemination, transportation of goods and individuals, professional services (corporate
management, medicine, legal advice, accounting, engineering), insurance, education, and banking.
32. WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 45; Cass & Noam, supra note 11, at 61-62; Murray Gibbs & Mina
Mashayekhi, Services: Cooperation for Development, 22 J. WORLD TRADE L. 81, 96-97 (1988) (listing
typical regulatory objectives of developing country governments).
33. See, e.g, BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 13-80; MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 26;
OECD, TRADE IN INFORMATION, COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATION SERVICES 12-17 (1990); Benz, supra
note 11, at 104-05; M. Veronica Pastor, The Problem of International Accounting Rates: The European
1994]
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Similarly, in the aviation industry, regulations often govern the fares that air
carriers may charge, the types of service they may provide, and the technical
and safety standards they must meet.34 Banking service providers are subject
to capital requirements, solvency ratios, liquidity rules, ownership rules,
educational qualifications, and deposit guarantee rules, as well as restrictions
on the types of services that they may provide. 5 Other highly regulated
services sectors include accounting, advertising, auto and equipment leasing,
financial services, and legal services.36
D. Measurement Difficulties
Difficulty in gathering data may present the greatest obstacle to
understanding service economies and liberalizing trade in services. 7 Services
trade is difficult to measure for various reasons. First, services do not
necessarily enter and exit countries as discrete, quantifiable units at convenient
customs ports.38 Second, balance of payment statistics have traditionally not
provided sufficiently disaggregated data on international transactions in
services. 39 For example, internationally traded services that are incorporated
into goods trade are not always reported separately.4"
Difficulties in measuring services trade impede quantification, and
consequently comparison, of the value of concessions exchanged in services
trade negotiations; this in turn hampers services trade liberalization.4 Such
difficulties become particularly pronounced when, as in the GATT context,
negotiations simultaneously cover dozens of unrelated sectors. When the
values of reciprocal concessions cannot be quantified or compared,
negotiations may degenerate into irrational political exercises not conducive
Cormnission Steps In, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 313 (1993); Andrew Adonis & Andrew Hill, Lifting the Lid
on Liberalisation, FIN. TIMES, May 10, 1993, at 13.
34. Secretariat of the International Civil Aviation Organization, Applicability or Inapplicability to
Air Transport of International Trade Concepts, in World-Wide Air Transport Colloquium, attachment B,
para. 24 (Apr. 6, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see WEISMAN, supra note 21, at
4, 12-20, 46; Benz, supra note 11, at 106-07.
35. Cillian Ryan, Trade Liberalisation and Financial Services, 13 WORLD ECON. 349, 351-52
(1990).
36. Benz, supra note 11, at 102-04.
37. Id.; see also WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 5 ("Data on services is appalling."); Christmas, supra
note 2, at 295; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 671-72; Maffucci, supra note 11, at 378; McCulloch, supra note
21, at 334; Nayyar, supra note 23, at 37 ("[A]ny attempt to measure international trade in services is
confronted by ... serious statistical difficulties."); Schott & Mazza, supra note 6, at 254.
38. Benz, supra note 11, at 98; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 672; McCulloch, supra note 21, at 334;
Interview with Vannessa Sciarra, Assistant General Counsel, USTR, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 25, 1993)
(The views she expressed were her own and not necessarily those of the USTR.).
39. Nayyar, supra note 23, at 37; see also Klaiman, supra note 2, at 671-72; Maffucci, supra note
11, at 378-79.
40. Christmas, supra note 2, at 295; Nayyar, supra note 23, at 37.
41. Such concerns prompted France, Italy, and other European countries initially to oppose services
trade liberalization. Maffucci, supra note 11, at 388.
[Vol. 19: 405
1994] Liberalizing Trade in Services
to reciprocal reductions of comparable trade barriers.42
Given these attributes that differentiate services from goods, it is not
surprising that services fall outside the GATT framework. However, the
GATT approach is now being applied to services trade liberalization by the
GNS through the GATS,43 and the GATT presents the point of origin for
most discussions of services trade in the GNS. While the GATS has yet to be
tested in practice, obligations within the GATT similar to those under the
GATS have developed a track record over the past four decades. For these
reasons, this Article turns next to an evaluation of the approach taken by the
GATT to determine its suitability for services sectors.
III. THE GATT AS A POINT OF ORIGIN
The GATT embodies the philosophy that international trade liberalization
serves the common interest of nations. This overarching principle is distilled
into specific rules mandating most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, national
treatment, institutionalized dispute resolution, and multilateralism.
A. Goals of Trade Liberalization
The GATT expressly embraces an economic and political philosophy
reflecting
the economic consensus that open trade would allow countries to specialize according to
their comparative advantage and thereby achieve higher levels of growth and well-being, and
the political consensus that a liberal trading regime would promote not only prosperity but
also peace."M
42. Two examples illustrate such difficulties:
[Would contracting parties which refuse to extend national treatment to foreign banks risk
retaliation in the form of the withdrawal of tariffconcessions on bananas or orange juice? Such
an approach opens a virtual Pandora's Box of coercion and retaliation ....
Gibbs, supra note 18, at 215.
[H]ow is it possible to exchange landing rights in the aviation sector with the right to open
branches in the banking sector? Or how is it possible to exchange a relaxation of restrictions
on transborder data flows with a relaxation of restrictions limiting the right of doctors to
medical practice in foreign countries? Indeed, it is well nigh impossible to conceive a scale
which would bring about a progressive reduction of barriers in the context of many service
sectors.
Nayyar, supra note 23, at 40.
43. See infra text accompanying note 167.
44. SPERO, supra note 2, at 95; see also ETHIER, supra note 2, at 5-46 (reviewing economic
advantages to trade liberalization); Richard Blackhurst et al., The Issue of Further Reductions in Barriers
to International Trade, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 94-95 (Robert E. Baldwin & J. David
Richardson eds., 1981) (reviewing economic advantages to trade liberalization and criticizing counter-
arguments); Brand, supra note 2, at 104-06; Davey, supra note 2, at 53; JACKSON, WORLD TRADING,
supra note 2, at 8-14. According to the Preamble to the GATT, its contracting parties acted
[r]ecognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor should be
conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the
resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods.
GATT, supra note 1, pmbl.
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Open, efficient, and liberalized trade is also seen to require unrestricted
transit45 and transparency.' Such goals generally also characterize the
GATS.47
In economic theory, liberalized trade permits countries to realize several
types of economic gains. Consumers of products and services that have been
more efficiently produced outside the home market gain from access to lower-
cost products. 48 Gains by consumers, who may themselves be producers of
other products, outweigh losses by those domestic producers who are unable
to meet foreign competition, which means that the national economy
experiences an overall net gain from trade.49 Although certain countries may
actually become worse off, the world economy on net will benefit."
Producers gain as they obtain access to lower cost inputs and scale
economies.' Given the scale economies that characterize services industries,
producers located in smaller countries are not necessarily at a cost
disadvantage.52 Competition forces producers to become more efficient,
which likewise brings benefits to consumers and national income. Indeed,
such efficiency gains may be the most significant benefit from services trade
liberalization. 3
Empirical studies of services industries have confirmed the existence of
such benefits. They have found that trade liberalization leads to increases in
45. A principle of unrestricted transit means that states will not impede trade involving third parties
that merely crosses through national territory. Benz, supra note 11, at 115.
46. Transparency means that trade regulations, practices, procedures and restrictions are thrust into
the public domain on the theory that increased public knowledge simplifies trade transactions and
discourages restrictions. BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 105; OECD, supra note 33, at 28, 31, 48;
Benz, supra note 11, at 115; Berg, supra note 6, at 11; Christmas, supra note 2, at 289 n.4; Annie E.
Lee, Comment, Toward Institutionalization of Reciprocity in Transnational Legal Services: A Proposalfor
a Multilateral Convention Underthe Auspices of GATT, 13 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 91, 122 (1990);
Maffucci, supra note 11, at 398; Nayyar, supra note 23, at 39; Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 131;
Randhawa, supra note 30, at 164.
The GATS includes a specific reference to transparency. GATS, supra note 8, art. III.
47. See GATS, supra note 8, pmbl.
48. WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 2-4, 157-58; Blackhurst et al., supra note 44, at 97-98; Schott &
Mazza, supra note 6, at 259-60.
49. Blackhurst et al., supra note 44, at 97-98.
50.. Markusen, supra note 26, at 95; McCulloch, supra note 21, at 339; Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra
note 32, at 90-93 (noting fear of LDCs that services trade liberalization may come at their expense); Ryan,
supra note 35, at 364.
The internationally divergent allocation of gains from trade liberalization, and particularly of gains
from services trade liberalization, has raised concerns about potential bias against LDC development. The
GATS does specifically address these issues. See GATS, supra note 8, art. IV. However, the abundant
literature on this subject is beyond the scope of this Article, which is written from the perspective of states
with well-developed services industries.
51. See WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 2-4, 156-58; Markusen, supra note 26, at 85; Schott & Mazza,
supra note 6, at 260.
52. McCulloch, supra note 21, at 339.
53. One commentator argues:
[The conventional and tested theory of the gains from trade is broadly applicable to services
as well as goods. But the gains from re-allocation of resources [owing to comparative advan-
tage] may be less important than those from better quality of service and stimulus to the
inherent efficiency of industry in the importing country through innovation and cheaper inputs.
Ewing, supra note 11, at 150.
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consumption and in the variety of services available to consumers. 4 The
promise of further such benefits drives current U.S. diplomatic efforts to
liberalize trade in such services sectors as air transportation.55 The
philosophy of mutual economic benefit from trade liberalization governs the
GATT-based approach. The GATT, like the GATS, distills this general
philosophy into specific rules deemed necessary to achieve trade liberalization
and its concomitant economic benefits.
B. Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
The MFN clause of the GATT provides:
Any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties.1
6
This provision suggests "that any benefits, privileges or concessions granted
by one signatory are automatically and unconditionally extended to all
signatories to the agreement."" Commentators frequently assert that this
MFN obligation of the GATT has had a salutary effect upon international
trade."8 The GNS consequently imposed a similar unconditional MFN
obligation on services in Article II of the GATS, 9 which is subject to many
of the same considerations and criticisms as its counterpart in the GATT. The
unconditional MFN obligation is perhaps best evaluated with reference to its
track record over the years as an element of the GATT.
Supporters of the MFN clause assert that it inhibits economically
54. WEISMAN, supra note 21, at2-4, 156-58; Miller, supra note 21, at343; Schott& Mazza, supra
note 6, at 259-60. See generally Berg, supra note 6, at 13-14; Ethier & Horn, supra note 23, at 235;
Nayyar, supra note 23, at 45. Empirical studies have found that international agreements liberalizing trade
in air transport services have "a positive and significant effect on both the level of passengers ... and on
the rate of passenger growth in a market." Martin Dresner & Robert Windle, The Liberalization of U.S.
International Air Policy: Impact on U.S. Markets and Carriers 11 (Nov. 1991) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author); see also infra note 55.
55. The Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs of the DOT has stated:
[Tihe comprehensive study of domestic airline competition that DOT completed earlier this
year showed that air travelers in the United States today are getting more service to more
cities at lower prices than ever before. Our experience with U.S. domestic airline deregulation
is what enables us to pursue international airline liberalization with such enthusiasm. We want
agreements that expand services, and the enormous economic dividends attributable to these
services, for the benefit of the travelling public, our communities, and our aviation industry.
We are realizing very positive results from that quest: the markets governed by our most
liberal accords are the markets in which we have seen the highest rates of traffic growth.
Jeffrey N. Shane, Remarks at SH&E Airline Business Conference on Europe 1992: A Single Aeropolitical
Market? 2-3 (Nov. 15, 1990) (transcript on file with author); see also Berg, supra note 6, at 13.
56. GATT, supra note 1, art. I(1).
57. Secretariat of the International Civil Aviation Organization, supra note 34, attachment B, para.
2; see also BERNT & WEiss, supra note 2, at 105; JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 133-48;
WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 77-78; MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, at para. 1140; Benz, supra note
11, at 114; Brand, supra note 2, at 121.
58. See, e.g., WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 77-78; Benz, supra note 11, at 114.
59. GATS, supra note 8, art. II; see also BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 105-08.
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inefficient trade restrictions, reduces the transactions costs of negotiating trade
agreements by presenting one rule of general application and by mitigating
disputes over the origin of goods, and often induces "a generalization of
liberalizing trade policies."60 MFN helps countries in poor bargaining
positions gain access to liberalization that they might not achieve through
negotiations turning solely upon mutual exchange of economically equivalent
concessions. 61 Not surprisingly, the MFN clause may well have brought
about the dramatic expansion in GATT membership over the past forty
years.62
Given these asserted benefits of MFN, one may wonder why major U.S.
service industries fiercely oppose attempts to subject them to MFN obligations
while simultaneously lobbying to liberalize international trade. 63 These
service industries are in part motivated by concerns over free riders.64 The
free-rider65 issue arises because an unconditional MFN obligation requires
each contracting state to treat all other contracting states similarly, regardless
of which of the others grant reciprocal trade concessions. For instance, if the
United States were to grant one foreign country the right to provide
commercial air service to New York, unconditional MFN would grant all
60. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 134; see also WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 99-100;
MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1140 (noting that MFN "transfers the benefits of bilateral trade
liberalization to third parties... thereby produc[ing] positive external effects ... [and] substantially
contribut[ing] to the stability of" GATT) (author's translation).
61. For instance, access to the markets of tiny Luxembourg or the LDCs is worth much less than
is access to the United States, the European Union, or Japan. Luxembourg or the LDCs would have
difficulty gaining access to valuable air transport markets for their national airlines if they could only offer
access to their own national markets as an inducement for liberalization. MFN, on the other hand, affords
all parties to an agreement equivalent treatment, regardless of negotiating position. Secretariat of the
International Civil Aviation Organization, supra note 34, attachment B, para. 5.
62. MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1140.
63. See BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 111-12 (discussing U.S. position on trade in
telecommunications services); Letter from Donald C. Comlish, Vice President of International Affairs, Air
Transport Association of America, to the Honorable Julius L. Katz, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative
1 (Oct. 24, 1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter Comlish Letter] (claiming to write on behalf of
"virtually all of the nation's scheduled airlines"); Letter from Talmage E. Simpkins, Executive Vice
President, Labor-Management Maritime Committee, Inc., et al., to the Honorable Samuel K. Skinner,
Secretary of Transportation & the Honorable Carla A. Hills, U.S. Trade Representative I (Nov. 30, 1990)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Simpkins Letter] (commercial aviation, maritime, and trucking
industries); Letter from James E. Landry, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Air Transport
Association of America, to the Honorable Julius Katz, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative 1 (Feb. 14,
1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Landry Letter] (commercial aviation); Letter from Warren L.
Dean, Partner, Dyer, Ellis, Joseph & Mills, Washington, D.C., to the Honorable Jeffrey Shane, Assistant
Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, U.S. Department of Transportation 1 (Dec. 17, 1991) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Dean Letter] (GATS negotiations and air transport services); see also Inter-
view with Richard M. Loughlin, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of International Aviation, DOT,
in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 25, 1993) (views he expressed were his own and not necessarily those of the
DOT) [hereinafter Loughlin Interview I].
64. BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 111-12 (telecommunications services); Landry Letter, supra
note 63 (commercial aviation); Interview with Richard M. Loughlin, Special Assistant to the Director,
Office of International Aviation, DOT, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 13, 1993) (views he expressed were
his own and not necessarily those of the DOT) [hereinafter Loughlin Interview II] (commercial aviation).
65. In economic terms, market failure allows a free rider to obtain access to a valuable public good
without stating or paying what he is actually willing to pay. See, e.g., THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN
ECONOMICS, supra note 21, at 166.
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other parties to a services accord the right to service New York, whether or
not the other states granted U.S. airlines reciprocal access to their own
national markets.66
The free-rider problem has three major consequences. First, negotiating
states cannot use trade concessions made during reciprocal bargaining to
induce free riders to open their markets because free riders receive the
benefits of concessions whether or not they make reciprocal concessions. Once
the United States grants any country access to New York, access to New York
falls away as a bargaining chip for use in negotiating U.S. access to restricted
cities in other contracting states. Access to U.S. services markets is a valuable
benefit, the grant or denial of which U.S. government negotiators and services
industries view as a tool for gaining access to foreign markets.' Second, the
free rider issue poses a disincentive to trade liberalization.6" If U.S. airlines
are subject to foreign competition and corresponding losses in domestic
market share without necessarily receiving access to valuable foreign markets
in return, then the United States will have little incentive to liberalize access
to its markets. Third, as countries seek to avoid bestowing unreciprocated
benefits upon free riders, agreements may be reduced to the lowest common
denominator set by those least willing to eliminate trade restrictions .69
Concerns that the unconditional MFN obligation may give rise to
significant free rider issues are not specific to international trade in services.
These concerns arise in goods sectors covered by an unconditional MFN
obligation under the GATT as well. Nevertheless, not all countries are
potential free riders, even if their air transport services trade were to be
subject to an MFN obligation. Within the European Union (EU), for instance,
major airports are open to international air traffic at the very least from other
66. BERNr & wEiss, supra note 2, at 111-12 (applying free-riding concept to telecommunications
services).
67. According to an Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs at the DOT,
itlhere can be no doubt that the success of U.S. negotiators in opening up foreign markets is
primarily attributable, first, to the attractiveness of the U.S. market and, second, to the fact
that the only way a foreign carrier can obtain new access to our market is by opening up its
market to some greater extent.
Shane, supra note 55, at 8; see also Daniel M. Kasper, Liberalizing Airline Services: How to Get from
Here to There, 11 WORLD ECON. 91, 98-100 (1988); Simpkins Letter, supra note 63, at I (maritime,
trucking and commercial aviation industries); Landry Letter, supra note 63 (commercial aviation services);
Loughlin Interview I, supra note 63 (commercial aviation services).
68. According to the Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the Air Transport Association
of America, "the absence of most favored nation obligations governing ... services allow[s] the
progressive liberalization of important bilateral relationships without concern for the policies of more
restrictive governments . . . . The further liberalization of high traffic density aviation markets will be
impaired if ... [restrictive] foreign governments are MFN bound under the GATS." Landry Letter, supra
note 63, at 1-2; see also Dean Letter, supra note 63; Loughlin Interview II, supra note 64.
69. According to a U.S. official involved in negotiating air transport services accords, "the sorts of
obligations likely to be established [under MFN] may well be 'lowest common denominators' rather than
genuine liberalizations. Instead of enhancing market access ... the agreement as applied to aviation could
end up legitimizing restrictive practices. . . ." Shane, supra note 55, at 6; see also Kasper, supra note
67, at 103 (noting "the inherent 'lowest common denominator' problem that plagues the GATT");
Loughlin Interview II, supra note 64.
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members of the European Union.7' Were MFN to govern United States-EU
aviation services trade, U.S. airlines would immediately gain access to all of
these European cities. Why, then, would U.S. airlines seek to avoid having
MFN apply to aviation services trade? There are three reasons.
First, were unconditional MFN as contemplated in the GATT to govern
worldwide aviation services trade, this obligation could not be limited to trade
between the United States and the EU. Instead, MFN would apply to all such
trade, including trade with free-riding states. One fundamental difficulty with
an agreement as broadly multilateral as the GATT is that it does not permit
distinctions among countries with radically different economic and foreign
trade policies.7 Second, were MFN to apply to the U.S. market as well,
U.S. airlines would face foreign competition, which they seek to avoid.7' As
in other sectors, aviation services producers and consumers do not share
identical interests. The GATT emphasizes reciprocal benefits to industries
without incorporating a competition policy to ensure that efficiency gains of
trade liberalization accrue to services consumers in addition to services
producers.' Third, many foreign airlines receive government subsidies and
other support. Privately owned U.S. airlines naturally wish to avoid
competition with such state-supported foreign entities.74 As will become
apparent below, however, the GATT-based approach may be modified to
address free rider and competition issues while at the same time retaining the
benefits afforded by MFN.7'
C. National Treatment
Another of the primary GATT obligations, national treatment, gives rise
to considerations similar to those raised by MFN. The national treatment
obligation implemented by the GATT states that "foreign suppliers of services
shall, in respect of national laws, regulations and administrative practices, be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to domestic suppliers
in the same market."76 Observers frequently assert that the national treatment
70. This becomes clear with even a cursory review of an airline flight schedule for the European
Union. See, e.g., 17 OAG DESKTOP FLIGHT GUIDE (worldwide ed. 1993).
71. Kasper, supra note 67, at 100-01. This issue is taken up again below. See infra part Iil.E.
72. Kasper, supra note 67, at 97.
73. See infra part IV.E.
74. Kasper, supra note 67, at 97.
75. See infra part 1V.C.2.
76. Secretariat of the International Civil Aviation Organization, supra note 34, attachment B, para.
16; see also BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 105; JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 189-202;
WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 77-78; Benz, supra note 11, at 114-15; Gold, supra note 6, at 303; Jackson,
Future Institutions, supra note 2, at 27; Maffucci, supra note 11, at 396; Nayyar, supra note 23, at 39;
Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 129; Randhawa, supra note 30, at 169-70; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 246;
Lee, supra note 46, at 120.
Article III of the GATT, "National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation," presents this
obligation:
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and
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obligation has had a salutary effect upon international trade and that it should
be included in an international services trade regime.77 The GNS
consequently included a national treatment obligation in the GATS.
7
National treatment is thus perhaps best evaluated with reference to its track
record as it has been implemented within the GATT and as it has been written
into the GATS.
1. Track Record of the National Treatment Obligation Under the GAYT
The national treatment obligation advances trade liberalization in several
ways. First, national treatment entitles foreign firms to the same business
opportunities and treatment as domestic firms, thereby establishing a basic
standard of equality between foreign and domestic products sold within a
country. 79 Thus, national treatment aims to ensure that trade concessions
made to liberalize the flow of products into a country are not subsequently
nullified by discriminatory internal measures, such as local content legislation
and other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) as well as discriminatory taxes.8"
Second, national treatment allows governments to retain regulatory control
over sectors regarded as being sensitive enough to warrant supervision,"' a
description that fits a number of services industries."2 At the same time,
however, national treatment may help to ensure that legitimate government
policy concerns regarding such sensitive sectors do not spawn protectionist
restrictions aimed at foreign service providers.3
The GATT does not carry national treatment far enough.84 As applied
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring
the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.
GATT, supra note 1, art. III. Article III spells out this general statement of principles in greater detail
regarding internal taxes in § 2, other internal "laws, regulations and requirements" in § 4, and domestic
content rules in § 5. However, § 8(a) specifically exempts government procurement policies
while § 8(b) specifically exempts "the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers."
77. WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 77-78, 99; Benz, supra note 11, at 115; Christmas, supra note 2,
at 301; Gold, supra note 6, at 303; Maffucci, supra note 11, at 396; Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 129;
Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 24; Dean Letter, supra note 63, at 2.
78. GATS, supra note 8, art. XVII; see also, BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 105-08.
79. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 189; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 24; Lee, supra
note 46, at 120.
80. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 189; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 24.
81. Benz, supra note 11, at 115; Maffucci, supra note 11, at 396; Lee, supra note 46, at 120-21.
82. See supra part II.C.
83. The national treatment obligation is particularly significant because "[t]he temptation of
legislators and other government officials to shape regulatory or tax measures so as to favor domestic
products seems to be very great, and proposals to do this are constantly suggested." JACKSON, WORLD
TRADING, supra note 2, at 190; see also WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 78; Schott & Mazza, supra note 6,
at 269.
84. Others have reached this conclusion as well:
[National treatment] is insufficient in present circumstances to promote liberalization of markets on
a broad basis .... IT]he concept does not on its own give the opportunity in most countries for
effective market access by service providers and therefore [must] be linked with the concept of
effective market access and progressive liberalization of markets.
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in GATT practice, national treatment does not create a right of establishment
or mitigate immigration rules. Most important, it cannot effectively prevent
de facto discrimination by highly technical, detailed, and -idiosyncratic
industry-specific regulatory schemes that, on their face, seem neutral.85 Such
NTBs, many of which explicitly target foreigners, particularly impede services
trade and thus must be addressed by any services trade liberalization effort. 6
Regulations that treat a foreign and a domestic services provider almost
exactly the same may unreasonably exclude foreign firms by subjecting them
to conditions that they cannot hope to meet. 7 The GNS, in drafting the
GATS, has attempted to address some of these difficulties.
OECD, supra note 33, at 29-30; see also Kasper, supra note 67, at 102 (supporting potential application
of national treatment to aviation services trade); Landry Letter, supra note 63, at 2 (noting insufficient
market access provisions, by comparison with existing sectoral agreements, in national treatmentprovisions
in GNS proposals).
85. "Because of the differences between countries of various industry structures ... strict but
equal ... [regulation] affects the foreign service firm to a much greater extent." Benz, supra note 11, at
115. See generally JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 192-99 (citing instances of trade disputes
concerning de facto discrimination).
86. For a detailed discussion of NTBs that inhibit services trade, see infra part IV.C.3; see also
Benz, supra note 11, at 115; Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra note 32, at 85-86, 103; Rivers et al., supra note
6, at 25.
87. The Investment Company Act (Act), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (1993), provides an
example of the exclusionary effect of complete national treatment of a foreign firm. Section 7(d) of the
Act, with which a foreign investment company must comply in order to conduct a public offering in the
United States, was intended to protect U.S. investors in foreign investment funds and effectively provides
national treatment for foreign funds registering in the United States. See DIVISION OF INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT, SEC, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY
REGULATION 189 (May 1992) [hereinafter DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT]. National treatment
in this context means that the foreign fund is not only treated like a U.S. fund, but that it is almost forced
to become a U.S. fund.
In implementing § 7(d),
... the [Securities and Exchange] Commission adopted rule 7d-l, setting forth the
conditions with which Canadian [and other foreign] applicants must comply to satisfy...
section 7(d). Among other criteria, the rule requires that
(1) the fund's charter and bylaws contain the substantive provisions of the [U.S.]
Investment Company Act, and an interpretation of the charter or bylaws [that] conform
with United States law;
(2) each officer, director, adviser, custodian, and underwriter for the investment
company enter into an agreement, filed with the Commission, that provides that each
will comply with the Investment Company Act, and that the shareholders of the
investment company may sue in the United States for any violation of the Investment
Company Act;
(3) at least a majority of the directors and officers be United States citizens, a majority
of whom will be United States residents;
(4) all of the investment company's assets be maintained in the United States with a
United States bank;
(5) the original or a duplicate copy of the investment company's books and records be
kept in the United States;
(6) the investment company's principal underwriter be a United States entity; and
(7) the investment company use a United States auditor.
Id. at 192-93. As the Securities and Exchange Commission itself concedes, "[blecause the conditions
dictate that a company relying on the rule be structured and operated in large part like a United States
investment company, they are impractical for most foreign investment companies." Id. at 193; see also
Loughlin Interview II, supra note 64 (in agreement regarding aviation services).
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2. The National Treatment Obligation as Written into the GATS
The GATS recognizes in principle that, in order to gain market access,
foreign service providers may need to receive treatment that is other than
absolutely identical with that given to domestic service providers."5 It does
not, however, rigorously apply its general statement of principle to address
the myriad, mundane details of specific national regulatory schemes. This
provision may thus have little practical effect. 9
Any attempt to apply national treatment to services trade must address
NTBs that inhibit services trade in particular.90 Unfortunately, this
proposition is not universally accepted, largely because these NTBs are
politically sensitive.91 This divergence in political positions underscores the
difficulty in applying obligations such as national treatment on as broadly
multilateral a basis as is attempted within the GATT-based approach.92
The GATS includes several obligations beyond a simple rule of national
treatment to address NTBs that specifically impede services trade. First, the
GATS mandates that member states provide market access to services suppli-
ers.93 It thus raises the issue of market access, which is distinct from equal
treatment, and addresses several impediments to services trade. This mandate
is, however, qualified by "the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and
specified" by each member state in its national schedule, which may be so
considerable as to nullify the effect of the general rule. 94 Further, this
mandate does not by itself resolve the technical, idiosyncratic regulatory
88. See GATS, supra note 8, art. XVII(2).
89. See infra part IV.D.
90. Nayyar, supra note 23, at 39.
91. According to the First Secretary at the Permanent Mission of India to the U.N. Offices,
[w]e have argued that such equivalent treatment of foreign enterprises [as would result from
such an application of national treatment to services] amounts to a guarantee of equal
opportunity to foreign nationals and foreign enterprises by the national government, which has
no basis in any other field of economic endeavor. Does any government permit equality of
opportunity to foreigners? It is obvious that what may be appropriate in the OECD context
may not be appropriate in the multilateral context ....
Randhawa, supra note 30, at 170; see also Nayyar, supra note 23, at 39; Schott & Mazza, supra note 6,
at 269.
92. See infra part III.E.
93. GATS, supra note 8, art. XVI.
94. Id. art. XVI(1). For example, qualifications by the U.S. in the "Radio and Television
Transmission Services" sector would appear to exclude any foreign radio or television broadcaster from
the U.S. market:
Radio and television licenses may not be held by: a foreign government; a corporation
chartered under the law of a foreign country or which has a non-U.S. citizen as an officer or
director or more than 20 percent of the capital stock of which is owned or voted by non-U.S.
citizens; a corporation chartered under the laws of the United States that is directly or
indirectly controlled by a corporation more than 25 percent of whose capital stock is owned
by non-U.S. citizens or a foreign government or a corporation of which any officer or more
than 25 percent of the directors are non-U.S. citizens.
Communication from the United States of America: Revised Final Schedule of the United States of
America Concerning Initial Commitments (draft) 17 (Dec. 15, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter U.S.
Schedule].
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regimes that impede services trade within each services industry.95 The
mandate also does not apply to services sectors for which a member state did
not make a market access commitment in its national schedule.96 Finally, the
requirement that states grant market access commitments on a non-discrim-
inatory basis would appear to raise the same concerns noted earlier regarding
an unconditional MFN obligation.97
Second, the GATS mandates impartial administration of domestic national
regulations.9" This development is also a positive one, but the GNS appears
to have so hedged the language of this provision with qualifications99 and
subjected it to future negotiation"° as to deprive it of much of its force and
practical relevance. This mandate also does not apply to services sectors for
which a member state did not make a market access commitment in its
national schedule.1 '
Third, the GATS contains an exhortation to GATS members to recognize
other national regulatory schemes as fulfilling their own regulatory
requirements. 2  The language, however, is permissive rather than
mandatory."3  In addition, this unconditional non-discrimination
requirement"' would appear to raise concerns similar to those noted earlier
regarding an unconditional MFN obligation. 15
The national treatment obligations of the GATT-based approach may be
improved to address NTBs that impede services trade. It is also possible to
address the practical difficulties of applying national treatment on as broadly
multilateral a basis as is attempted within the GATT-based approach." 6
D. Dispute Resolution Mechanism
The trade dispute resolution mechanism of the GATT represents an
unprecedented degree of commitment by its members to resolve disputes
95. See infra part IV.D.
96. GATS, supra note 8, art. XVI(1).
97. See supra part III.B.
98. See GATS, supra note 8, art. VI.
99. For instance, member states are to ensure that domestic regulations "are administered in a
reasonable, objective and impartial manner." Id. art. VI(1) (emphasis added). By themselves, these broad
terms do little to provide guidance in specific cases. In U.S. jurisprudence, for instance, such terms derive
meaning only over time as courts apply them in specific cases. Such terms will likely be susceptible to
divergent interpretations among GATS members and to obstructionist interpretations by states that are
averse to rapid services trade liberalization. This language will undermine the force of the Article. See
infra part III.E.
100. GATS, supra note 8, art. VI(4).
101. Id. art. VI(1).
102. See id. art. VII.
103. Id. art. VIIi(). Given the very permissive language of this section ("a Member may
recognize... "), one is left to wonder what legal effect, if any, it has. Sovereign states, after all, surely
have the power to recognize foreign regulatory schemes even in the absence of the "permission" granted
by this paragraph.
104. Id. art. VII(3).
105. See supra part III.B.
106. See infra part W.C.3.
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among themselves by means of an orderly, prescribed series of steps. No
other international agreement has been adopted by more sovereign states, or
is applied to resolve as many disputes among them, as is the GATT."07
The GATS contains a dispute resolution mechanism that draws heavily on
that of the GATT, both in its language and in its substance." 8 Thus, the
dispute resolution mechanism is perhaps best evaluated with reference to its
operation within the GATT context." The mechanism is usually invoked
by a member state that believes that benefits due it under the GATT are being
"nullified or impaired."110 The mechanism involves a series of roughly
seven steps."' First, GATT member states may consult with one another on
any issue and receive "sympathetic consideration" of their proposals.112 If
consultations fail to resolve an issue, the complaining member may seek
recommendations from other members of the GATT, its Director-General,
Council, or "any appropriate inter-governmental organization."13 The
complaining member may then petition the GATT Council1 4 to appoint a
panel consisting of individuals drawn from member states." 5 This GATT
panel investigates the issue presented to it and then recommends modification
of the disputed measure, compensation, or retaliation. 16 To become
effective, the report and recommendations of the panel must be adopted by the
GATT Council, which may require further negotiation and analysis." 7 The
member state criticized by the panel report voluntarily determines whether or
not to abide by the nonbinding recommendations of the panel."' Finally, the
107. The GATT dispute resolution mechanism deals "with far more countries and far more cases
than, for example, the World Court or any other broadly based international tribunal." Jackson, Future
Institutions, supra note 2, at 18; see also JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 91-92; Benz, supra
note 11, at 115.
108. See GATS, supra note 8, arts. XXII, XXIII.
109. Many of the criticisms raised here are not unique to the services context, but of course apply
as well to the resolution of disputes involving trade in goods.
110. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII(1); see also JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 94;
Benz, supra note 11, at 115; Davey, supra note 2, at 55; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 660.
111. These steps are primarily contained in Articles XXII (Consultation) and XXIII (Nullification
or Impairment) of the GATT. In addition, a written understanding in 1979 codified the "informal dispute
settlement procedures" that had developed through practice over three decades. Klaiman, supra note 2,
at 661. A ministerial declaration in 1982 reaffirmed this understanding. Davey, supra note 2, at 58; see
also JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 94-97; MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para.
1140; Davey, supra note 2, at 54-55; Mafflcci, supra note 11, at 405-08.
112. GATT, supra note 1, arts. XXII, XXIII; see also Davey, supra note 2, at 58; Klaiman, supra
note 2, at 661. Indeed, Article XXII proceedings offer nothing outside of consultations. MONOPOLKOM-
MISSION, supra note 2, para. 1140.
113. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIII(2); see also Davey, supra note 2, at 58; Klaiman, supra note
2, at 662.
114. The GATT Council "meets more or less monthly and is open to all contracting parties willing
to participate. It has been delegated all of the powers of the contracting parties, except the power to grant
waivers. Its decisions may be appealed to the contracting parties, acting as a group." Davey, supra note
2, at 55 n. 10.
115. MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1140; see also JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra
note 2, at 96; Davey, supra note 2, at 58-59; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 662-63.
116. Davey, supra note 2, at 59-60.
117. Id. at 60; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 663.
118. MONOPOLKOMMIsSION, supra note 2, para. 1140; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 663.
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complainant may petition for permission "to suspend the application to any
other contracting party [to the GATT] of such obligations or concessions
under [the GATT] as they determine to be appropriate in the circum-
stances."119 Retaliation, however, has been authorized only once in the
history of the GATT.' 2°
Despite its advantages, the GATT dispute resolution mechanism is beset
by significant difficulties, both generally and in its specific application to trade
in services. Such difficulties involve procedural issues such as delays,
obstruction by affected member states, the absence of an effective enforcement
mechanism, and uncertainty over the goals of the dispute resolution
mechanism. In addition, the GATT dispute resolution mechanism is applied
so infrequently as to raise questions about its relevance to most trade disputes.
1. Procedural Issues
The GATT dispute resolution mechanism may appear interminably slow
from the perspective of parties contesting disputed practices. Aside from the
domestic and international negotiations and consultations that precede
appointment of a panel, however, GATT dispute resolution proceedings have
recently been concluded on average in under two years.1 21  GATT
proceedings have dragged on for up to eight years, 22 but that is not the
norm. The length of GATT proceedings thus appears to compare favorably
with the speed of domestic litigation in many countries."z Even though
these statistics are encouraging, they are somewhat misleading in that they
exclude significant sources of delay.
First, the GATT, an international agreement governed by rules of public
international law, does not incorporate a direct private right of action for
individuals.124 Instead, private complainants must first successfully lobby
their own governments to champion a complaint through diplomatic channels,
a step not present in domestic litigation. 1 Whether relevant government
119. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXlIl(2); see also MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1140;
Davey, supra note 2, at 60; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 663.
120. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 96; KEOHANE, supra note 2, at 104-05; Davey,
supra note 2, at 60; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 663.
121. Davey, supra note 2, at 84-85 (noting improvement in speed of proceedings); see also
MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1141 (same).
122. This was true in the now infamous DISC case. Davey, supra note 2, at 84; Klaiman, supra note
2, at 666.
123. Id.
124. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 103-04; MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2,
para. 1144; Brand, supra note 2, at 126-34.
125. In the United States, complainants may lobby or may file petitions under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974. The "New Commercial Policy Instrument" of the European Union has a similar aim.
See generally JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 103-09; KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, sUpra
note 15, at 817-20; MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1151; Brand, supra note 2, at 126-27.
Individuals do also have the option of pursuing anti-dumping, countervailing duty and other causes
of action under national laws. See, e.g., JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 103-09, 217-73;
KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, supra note 15, at 807-20; Brand, supra note 2, at 115-16, 126-28. However,
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departments currently have the resources to advocate the interests of their
nationals in the hundreds of trade disputes that occur every year is
questionable.
126
Second, a complaining member state does not have the absolute right to
initiate the formal dispute resolution mechanism by obtaining appointment of
a panel. 7 Instead, it must first consult with the opposing state(s). The
complainant must then pursue additional diplomacy to secure sufficient votes
in the GATT Council to obtain the appointment of a panel. As the opposing
state(s) argue against appointment of a panel, delay is the inevitable result.
Once the GATT Council has decided to appoint a panel, further delay
results as the parties negotiate its composition. 128 None of this delay is taken
into account in calculating the recent two-year average duration of GATT
proceedings. The delay is attributable to the emphasis upon diplomacy and
consensus in GATT proceedings. 9 This is true especially because a party
allegedly infringing GATT rules must be part of the consensus-based
resolution of a dispute.
Third, the GATT Council must adopt a completed panel report. A losing
state "may hold up adoption of a panel report interminably while it purports
to analyze it and to explore possible negotiated solutions with the prevailing
party."130 Given the average two-year duration of GATT proceedings, this
is not a major source of delay, although it has been the source of the most
serious of recent delays.'
Fourth, the GATT lacks an effective enforcement mechanism. By one
calculation, perhaps 7-8% of panel reports have not been followed.'32 The
GATT Secretariat found that fewer than 4% of panel reports led to
noncompliance.' 33 These statistics do not, however, consider situations in
which a complainant failed to have a panel convened or in which a panel
failed to reach a result.
Perhaps the fundamental issue behind procedural difficulties with the
dispute resolution mechanism is the international ideological dispute over its
these domestic, private causes of action do not afford the private plaintiff a direct attack on disputed
foreign government policies.
126. Reports of the apparently modest financial resources of the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative suggest that it could not now annually prosecute hundreds of trade cases on behalf of
individual complainants. See Keith Bradsher, U.S. Trade Office Skimps: Its $20 Million Budget Is Called
Small, INT'L HERALD TRal., Nov. 2, 1993, at 11.
127. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 98; Davey, supra note 2, at 58, 91.
128. Davey, supra note 2, at 58-59; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 664-65.
129. For a detailed discussion of opportunities for obstruction in the decisionmaking processes within
the GATT dispute resolution mechanism, see Davey, supra note 2, at 90-98; see also JACKSON, WORLD
TRADING, supra note 2, at 97; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 665-66.
130. Davey, supra note 2, at 60; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 665.
131. Davey, supra note 2, at 85.
132. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 101. By another observation, almost all GATT
panel reports issued since the beginning of the 1980s have been accepted by the disputants.
MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1141.
133. Davey, supra note 2, at 86.
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purpose. Should the system seek primarily to achieve international consensus
that includes even the "offending" state(s), as it presently does? Or, should
it follow an adjudicatory model, similar to that applied by Western courts to
resolve commercial disputes? 34
2. Infrequent Application of the Dispute Resolution Mechanism
At first blush, the GATT dispute resolution mechanism would appear to
play an active role in resolving trade disputes among nations. Approximately
233 cases have been brought under the GATT dispute resolution mechanism
in the forty years between its inception and 1988.' One commentator notes
that the mechanism has had a "burgeoning of business" since 1979, when it
saw "from five to seven disputes processed in the system per year."'36 At
this rate, the GATT mechanism would have addressed about 100 international
trade disputes in the fifteen years since 1979.
Unfortunately, and despite the optimism of some observers, the relative
infrequency of application of the GATT dispute resolution mechanism
becomes readily apparent upon comparison with the volume of trade cases
handled by other jurisdictions. While other trade regulatory schemes and the
GATT do not necessarily apply concurrently to all the same types of disputes,
there are both significant areas of potential jurisdictional overlap and
significant disparities in the volumes of disputes reviewed.
U.S. courts and administrative agencies, for instance, have reviewed over
300 countervailing duty cases 37 and over 420 allegations of dumping since
1979,'13 and more than 70 Section 301 petitions between 1974 and
1989. 139These disputes could potentially have been reviewed by the GATT
dispute resolution mechanism applying legal norms of the GATT. 4 ' Instead,
these disputes were reviewed by U.S. institutions applying domestic U.S. law.
134. This controversy is not addressed here, because its mere existence as a force weakening the
GATT mechanism is more relevant than are the substantive issues involved. For a detailed review of this
debate, see, e.g., JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 91-94; Brand, supra note 2, at 123-25;
Davey, supra note 2, at 65-81; Jackson, Future Institutions, supra note 2, at 19-21.
135. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 98.
136. Davey, supra note 2, at 81. The "increasing importance" of the GATT dispute settlement
system is also noted by the German government Monopolkommission. MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note
2, para. 1141 (translation by the author).
137. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 251. Another tabulation of U.S. countervailing
duty disputes lists about 220, of which about 10 were initiated prior to 1979. PATTISON, supra note 2, app.
B.
138. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 228. Another tabulation of U.S. dumping disputes
lists about 475 actions, of which about 30 were initiated before 1979. PATTISON, supra note 2, app. A.
139. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 106.
140. GATT, supra note 1, arts. VI (anti-dumping and countervailing duties), XVI (subsidies);
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204 (generally known as the GATT
Subsidies Code); Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919 (generally known as the GATT Anti-Dumping Code). See
generally JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 225-28, 249-73; PATrISON, supra note 2.
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The GATT presents many more types of legal norms, alleged violations
of which at least potentially could be reviewable under the GATT dispute
resolution mechanism, than those at issue in the three types of trade disputes
for which U.S. statistics are available. Even counting only these three dispute
types, U.S. courts and administrative processes handled at least eight times
as many trade disputes as were actually handled by the GATT mechanism in
the fifteen years since 1979 (or since 1974, in the case of Section 301
petitions). These disputes could potentially have been handled by the GATT
mechanism. The comparatively infrequent application of the GATT
mechanism to disputes involving the United States correspondingly diminishes
the relevance of GATT legal norms, as opposed to domestic U.S. law, to
trade involving the United States.
The U.S. legal system is certainly not the only jurisdiction that reviews
trade disputes that could also be addressed in the GATT framework. Others
of the ninety-six or so states' that currently make up the GATT
membership maintain similar trade laws. 42  Multilateral international
agreements other than the GATT also provide for multinational trade dispute
resolution mechanisms.143 Thus, each year, thousands of international trade
disputes are resolved outside the GATT dispute resolution mechanism. The
GATT mechanism and, by extension, the international legal norm of the
GATT are consequently of little relevance to the vast majority of trade
disputes.
To be effective and relevant, any framework attempting to liberalize
services trade will require a dispute resolution mechanism that works and is
141. JAcKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 48. The GATT applies to about 115 states if one
includes non-party states that voluntarily apply GATT rules to their trade relations. MONOPOLKOMMISSION,
supra note 2, para. 1140; PATTISON, supra note 2, § 1.05[1], at 1-18 n.1; Brand, supra note 2, at 121;
Klaiman, supra note 2, at 658.
142. For instance, the European Union and its member states severally, Japan, New Zealand, South
Africa, Australia, and Canada have domestic legislation at least partly overlapping GATT rules. See
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 228; MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, paras. 1151-54;
John H. Jackson & William J. Davey, Reform of the Administrative Procedures Used in U.S.
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases 21-27 (Nov. 1991) (report available from the Administrative
Conference of the United States, Washington, D.C.).
143. For instance, the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement provides for binational
adjudicatory panels. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, ch.19, 27 I.L.M. 281
(1988). For decisions rendered by U.S.-Canada binational panels, see NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS: UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: BINATIONAL PANEL REVIEWS AND
REPORTS (James R. Holbein & Donald J. Musch eds., 1993).
Professor Davey notes that "the formation and expansion of the [EC] ... diverted the attention of
most of the European countries, which had previously been active in the [GATT] dispute settlement
system. With the advent of the EC, disputes between EC members were settled within EC institutions."
Davey, supra note 2, at 63. The Commission of the European Communities and the European Court of
Justice have rendered thousands of decisions regarding economic and trade disputes among the member
states of the European Communities. See generally, KAPTEYN & VAN THEMAAT, supra note 15. One
tabulation lists about 145 anti-dumping and subsidy actions brought by the European Community against
non-members between 1985 and 1991; however, this represents a minute fraction of trade disputes
addressed by EC institutions. PATTISON, supra note 2, app. N. In the ten years following 1979, EC
institutions averaged about five anti-dumping proceedings per year. PATTISON, supra note 2, § 16.01, at
16-4.
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utilized.'" Weaknesses with the mechanism in place under the GATT
present one motive of major U.S. services industries to lobby vehemently not
only against the mechanism, but the GATT-GNS framework as well. 145
3. The GATS Dispute Resolution Mechanism
The GATS includes a dispute resolution mechanism. However, it draws
heavily from that of the GATT and raises some of the same concerns. First,
aside from the provision for the resolution of disputes in double taxation
treaties,'" the approach is consensus-oriented, aimed at producing solutions
"mutually satisfactory" both to the complainant and alleged offender.147
Second, while the GATS mechanism includes provisions for retaliatory
measures to enforce compliance, 4 1 one must bear in mind that such
measures under a similar provision in the GATT were implemented only once
in forty years. 149 It remains to be seen whether the GATS enforcement
mechanism will prove to be more effective. Third, until the GATS specifically
addresses the multitude of industry-specific national regulatory schemes that
impede services trade, national legal norms will continue to be more relevant
to services trade than GATS norms.'50 Finally, access to the GATS
mechanism is granted only to member states and not to services producers
themselves.' Members of the GATT appear to have committed recently to
increasing the effectiveness of GATT-based dispute resolution.' 2 Thus, the
GATS mechanism may prove to be more effective than the track record of the
GATT mechanism would suggest.
In summary, the GATT-based approach to dispute resolution is inadequate
for two reasons. First, the delay, orientation towards international consensus,
and opportunities for obstruction present in the GATT mechanism impair its
144. This has been argued elsewhere as well. MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, paras. 1140,
1144, 1146; Berg, supra note 6, at 12; Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra note 32, para. 12; Maffucci, supra
note 11, at 405-08; Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 133; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 25.
145. Comlish Letter, supra note 63, at 1-2 (commercial aviation); Simpkins Letter, supra note 63
(maritime, trucking and commercial aviation industries); Dean Letter, supra note 63, at 2 (commercial
aviation); Loughlin Interview 11, supra note 64 (commercial aviation).
146. GATS, supra note 8, art. XXII(3).
147. Id. art. XXII(1),(3); see supra text accompanying note 134 (noting difficulties with consensus-
oriented approach to dispute resolution under GATT). One observer optimistically notes that the World
Trade Organization (VITO) "will operate, as Gatt [sic] now does, on the basis of consensus. The main
exception is dispute settlement where offending countries will no longer be able to block adoption of panel
reports." Frances Williams, WTO - A New Name Heralds New Powers, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1993, at
5.
148. GATS, supra note 8, art. XXIII(2).
149. See supra text accompanying note 120.
150. See supra part III.D.2.
151. See supra text accompanying note 124 (noting concerns raised by absence of direct private right
of action by individual services producers).
152. See Williams, supra note 147, at 5; see also Frances Williams, Confiision over Section 301
Powers on Services, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 17, 1993, at 4 (discussing impressions of EU and U.S. officials
that more disputes, including those regarding services, will now be subject to multilateral dispute resolution
to exclusion of unilateral national measures).
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effectiveness in resolving trade disputes. Second, the GATT mechanism
addresses too few of the myriad mundane disputes that arise in goods trade
and that could reasonably be expected to arise in services trade to accord
GATT legal norms supremacy over domestic regulation or general relevance
to trade disputes. Since the GATS mechanism draws heavily from that of the
GATT, the GATS would appear to raise similar concerns.' 53
E. Multilateralism
The foregoing discussions of MFN, national treatment obligations, and
dispute resolution have noted the difficulties in applying these principles in as
broadly multilateral a manner as that attempted in the GATT. The GATT,
with ninety-six member countries, is one of the most broadly multilateral
international agreements in existence. It provides a single multilateral
framework to negotiate reductions in trade barriers and thereby eliminates the
need to negotiate many bilateral agreements.155 The GATT thus serves as
a valuable forum for the discussion and resolution of international trade issues
that is open to almost all the nations of the world. This is surely beneficial,
and I do not argue here that the GATT or GNS should be abolished.
Nonetheless, the all-inclusive multilateralism of the GATT-based approach is
one of its central weaknesses.
1. Fundamental Disagreement over Progress in Services Trade
Ideological schisms in the world trading community - particularly
between LDCs and developed countries (DCs) - cripple the capacity of
institutions as broadly multilateral as the GATT to pursue multilateral
negotiations aimed at liberalizing international services trade. For years, the
United States and other DCs have sought to introduce services trade
liberalization talks into the GATT framework.'56 The Carter administration
153. See infra part IV.B.
154. See supra note 141.
155. For instance,
[t]he global approach would have the advantage of avoiding repetitive, time consuming and
costly negotiations of substantially the same issues in each industry while, at the same time,
providing for the idiosyncratic needs of very diverse industries. Furthermore, this approach
"results in a more organized, less complicated, body of legislation than does the individual
industry or selective approach."
Mafflicci, supra note 11, at 402-03 (footnote omitted); see also Brand, supra note 2, at 121-22; Gold,
supra note 6, at 290 ("The alternative of negotiating an independent multilateral trade agreement, with its
own organizational supporting structure for administration and dispute resolution wholly outside the
GATT, is unrealistic."); Kasper, supra note 67, at 99-100 (noting that some argue "that an umbrella
agreement is likely to result in an efficient use of negotiating resources, for it would develop a single set
of rules and procedures for identifying and reducing barriers to expanded trade in all service industries");
Schott & Mazza, supra note 6, at 267.
156. Berg, supra note 6, at 2-3; Schott & Mazza, supra note 6, at 254. Services trade issues
(transport insurance) were already broached under GATT auspices in the 1950s. Berg, supra note 6, at
2. The Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations in the mid-1960s brought the "first attempt" to attack NTBs,
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attempted, with little success, to introduce services trade issues at the 1973-79
Tokyo Round.'57 At a GATT ministerial meeting in November 1982, the
United States introduced services trade liberalization as a priority issue and
encountered responses "varying from 'cautious' or 'cool' to downright
hostil[e]." '5 In 1984, the United States managed, in "gruelling all-night
negotiations," to extract an agreement from the other GATT parties to study
services trade issues."s9 Finally, in September 1986, services trade issues
were officially included in the agenda adopted for the Uruguay Round, but
only after the United States threatened that it would otherwise not participate
in the Round. 60
Some LDCs, most notably India and Brazil, have vehemently opposed
efforts to include services trade issues within GATT discussions.' Their
opposition stems in part from a belief that the benefits of services trade
liberalization would accrue to DCs - that services trade flows primarily from
DCs to LDCs by virtue of the economic power and comparative advantage of
DCs '6 and that liberalization would exacerbate balance of payments
problems for LDCs.'63 LDCs use the "infant industry" argument to justify
protecting their service producers from having to compete against the capital
investments, knowledge base, and scale economies of DC services
producers." 6 Given the perceived significance of services sectors to national
security and development, LDC governments seek to avoid dependence on
large, foreign corporations in this area. 6 ' Beyond these concerns, LDCs
which present perhaps the primary barrier to services trade. Jackson, Recent Problems, supra note 2, at
10.
157. Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 16-18. While not on the agenda for negotiation, services were
cursorily mentioned in the GATT Government Procurement Code resulting from the Tokyo Round. Id.;
see also Mafficci, supra note 11, at 390; Schott & Mazza, supra note 6, at 265.
158. Ewing, supra note 11, at 147; see also Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra note 32, at 82-83; Gold,
supra note 6, at 285; Mafflcci, supra note 11, at 371; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 21.
159. Gibbs, supra note 18, at 203; see also Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra note 32, para. 6.
160. Berg, supra note 6, at 1, 13; Jackson, Future Institutions, supra note 2, at 21; Jackson, Recent
Problems, supra note 2, at 2; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 658; McCulloch, supra note 21, at 333; Nayyar,
supra note 23, at 35; Randhawa, supra note 30, at 163-67; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 19.
161. BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 106-07 (noting that DCs and LDCs disagree over
telecommunications services liberalization); SPERO, supra note 2, at 123-24; Berg, supra note 6, at 3-4,
17-18; Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra note 32, at 90-91; Jackson, Recent Problems, supra note 2, at 3;
McCulloch, supra note 21, at 332-33; Nayyar, supra note 23, at 35; Randhawa, supra note 30, at 166;
Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 19; Schott & Mazza, supra note 6, at 254.
162. One LDC observer writes of "the virtual hegemony of Transnational Corporations in services,"
which he asserts is "fairly well documented." Randhawa, supra note 30, at 169; see also Berg, supra note
6, at 19; Jackson, Recent Problens, supra note 2, at 3; Schott & Mazza, supra note 6, at 259-60.
163. Gibbs,& Mashayekhi, supra note 32, at 97; Nayyar, supra note 23, at 43, 46.
164. Berg, supra note 6, at 18; Ewing, supra note 11, at 157; Nayyar, supra note 23, at 45; Rivers
et al., supra note 6, at 19; Schott & Mazza, supra note 6, at 261.
165. Nayyar, supra note 23, 46-47 ("Sectors such as banking, insurance, shipping, transport and
telecommunications constitute the core of the infrastructure that is strategic in the process of development.
Most developing countries wish to retain control over their banking and insurance sectors which mobilize
resources to finance the process of development; the allocation of these scarce resources and the
effectiveness of financial policies are both, in a sense, a function of such control."); Berg, supra note 6,
at 18 ("The governments of ... [LDCs] often own and operate such service industries as banking,
insurance, shipping, and telecommunications. Authorities use these industries as instruments of national
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view obstruction of services trade liberalization as a negotiating tool. LDCs
wish to achieve further liberalization of goods trade under the GATT to
achieve access to DC markets for farming, textile, raw material, and other
LDC exports; because services trade liberalization is primarily of interest to
DCs, LDCs obstruct progress on services trade in order to pressure DCs to
advance goods trade liberalization and open DC markets to LDC exports.,66
That twenty years of negotiations had achieved only agreement to begin
discussion of services trade issues suggests that LDC obstruction has not been
without success. Twenty years of negotiations resulted in a diplomatic and
rhetorical compromise to create the Group on Negotiations on Services
(GNS).167 While the GNS talks preserve the appearance of multilateral
GATT trade negotiations, they are technically conducted outside the GATT
framework. 6 ' The vehemence of disagreement over services trade and the
decades required to initiate negotiations do not bode well for the successful
or expeditious completion of planned future rounds of GNS negotiations. 69
economic and social policy."); see also supra part II.C; BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 109; Ewing,
supra note 11, at 156; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 19; Schott & Mazza, supra note 6, at 263-64.
166. Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra note 32, at 90; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 19; Schott & Mazza,
supra note 6, at 267.
167. WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 55-56, 160-67; Gibbs, supra note 18, at 199-203; Gibbs &
Mashayekhi, supra note 32, at 81; Jackson, Recent Problems, supra note 2, at 3-4; Nayyar, supra note
23, at 35-36; Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 125; Randhawa, supra note 30, at 163-65; Rivers et al., supra
note 6, at 19.
According to the Ministerial Declaration adopted at Punta del Este launching the Uruguay Round,
Ministers also decide[d], as part of the Multilateral Trade [GATT] Negotiations, to
launch negotiations on trade in services.
Negotiations in this area shall aim to establish a multilateral framework of principles and
rules for trade in services, including elaboration of possible disciplines for individual sectors,
with a view to expansion of such trade under conditions of transparency and progressive
liberalization and as a means of promoting economic growth of all trading partners and the
development of developing countries. Such framework shall respect the policy objectives of
national laws and regulations applying to services and shall take into account the work of
relevant international organizations.
GATT procedures and practices shall apply to these negotiations. A Group on
Negotiations on Services is established to deal with these matters. Participation in the
negotiations under this Part of the Declaration will be open to the same countries as under Part
I. GATT secretariat support will be provided, with technical support from other organizations
as decided by the Group of Negotiations on Services.
The Group of Negotiations on Services shall report to the Trade Negotiations
Committee.
Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round (Sept. 20, 1986), in GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS
IN TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 19, 28 (33d Supp. 1987).
168. According to an Indian government official,
[Tihe Negotiations on Services are conducted as a distinct process outside the framework of
GATT. This is reflected in the fact that the ... [GNS] has been established by Ministers...
[in their capacity as Ministers and not as representatives of parties to the GATT] and reports
to the Trade Negotiations Committee..., which defers to the Ministers, and stands outside
and above the GATT framework for the Group of Negotiations on Goods. Hence, while it is
correct to say that negotiations on Services are taking place in the Uruguay Round it is
incorrect to refer to them as GATT negotiations on Services.
Randhawa, supra note 30, at 164; see also Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra note 32, at 83; Nayyar, supra note
23, at 35-36; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 19.
169. See Randhawa, supra note 30, at 164-65; see also Nayyar, supra note 23, at 36 ("[Tihe
negotiations on trade in services are likely to be difficult, just as progress is bound to be slow."); Schott
& Mazza, supra note 6, at 271 ("U.S. policymakers understand that services negotiations will have a long
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Some LDC views of the likely future course of GNS negotiations suggest a
very slow process indeed.17
Worse, services negotiations are marked by disagreement even among
developed states. Among members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), for example,' the EU only
recently came to support U.S. efforts regarding services trade. Moreover,
disagreements between the EU and United States have continued to be
potential deal-breakers." Hope is scant for real progress regarding services
trade in a forum as all-inclusively multilateral as the GATT when even a
group of nations as similar as the OECD membership cannot reach agreement
on this issue without extreme difficulty.
Issues other than services trade also produce deep divisions and
concomitant protracted negotiations yielding few tangible results. Insufficient
progress on agricultural trade has been a source of frustration for at least
thirty years. The United States and other states that tried and failed to
introduce agricultural goods into the GATT system both in the Kennedy
Round (1962-65) and in the Tokyo Round (1973-79) had "made it a high
priority matter" to pursue agricultural issues in the current Uruguay
Round." Agricultural trade issues are contentious even among groups of
nations as similar as the United States and the EU.174
In short, the world trading community has been riven by multiple,
time-fuse.").
170. According to an Indian official,
the GNS should begin its deliberations with a general debate on how each participant sees the
process of negotiations on Services .... [In addition,] definition and statistical issues related
to trade in Services would have to be addressed in the initial phase of work in the GNS ....
Developing countries such as Brazil and India have argued that considering so little is known
about this complex subject, we should begin with a factual examination of the specific sectors
which any eventual package for negotiations is likely to cover.
Randhawa, supra note 30, at 166. Prior to any discussion of rules or principles relevant to services trade,
this LDC view envisions debate over industries to be covered by services trade liberalization and an
examination of existing international disciplines and arrangements. Id. at 166-67. In light of the political
schism between DCs and LDCs regarding services trade liberalization, proposals for such a thorough,
piecemeal program of definition and study suggests that decades of further negotiation would precede any
services trade agreement.
171. The OECD has been pursuing services trade liberalization at least since 1960, but without
achieving more than "political statements of intent" that "are not legally binding." Benz, supra note 11,
at 113; see also Ewing, supra note 11, at 154 ("[OECD] Members seem to be unenthusiastic. The codes
[written regarding services]... are weak. OECD is a consultative rather than a negotiating body.");
Maffucci, supra note 11, at 391-93.
172. Dodwell, supra note 8, at 4; Dodwell & Barber, supra note 8, at 1; David Dodwell & David
Gardner, US and EU Under Attack Over Gatt Delays, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at 1; David Dodwell
& Frances Williams, EU and US Clear Final Hurdles to World Trade Deal, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993,
at 1; David Gardner & David Dodwell, Gatt Deal May Hinge on US Demands in Audio-Visual Sector,
FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1993, at 1; Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra note 32, at 89; Jackson, Recent Problems,
supra note 2, at 3; McCulloch, supra note 21, at 333; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 20-21.
173. Jackson, Future Institutions, supra note 2, at 11-12; see also JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra
note 2, at 2 ("The subject of agriculture has been very, very difficult for GATT throughout its history.
The disciplines of GATT legally do apply to agricultural goods but in practice they have tended not to
apply. The whole area of agriculture trade in the world has.., largely escaped the discipline of
GATT.").
174. SPERO, supra note 2, at 104-05; Jackson, Future Institutions, supra note 2, at 12.
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vehement disputes, each of which has endured without proper resolution for
at least two decades. The all-encompassing multilateral character of the
GATT, as the following section argues, makes it no longer capable of
resolving such disputes because postwar political developments have altered
the political landscape out of which it arose.
2. GA7T as the Product of Unique Circumstances
The GATT was the product of the unique political and economic circum-
stances that existed after the Second World War. The United States and its
Allies had vanquished Japan and Nazi Germany and had overcome the Great
Depression. Consequently, the Allies enjoyed a position of world dominance
and leadership that allowed them to propose an ambitious, idealistic plan to
recast the international political landscape to avoid further economic instability
and war.175 The GATT was one element of this plan.
However, the initial goodwill and postwar momentum dissipated and the
moment slipped away. 76 The wartime alliance between the West and the
Soviet Union deteriorated rapidly into the Cold War, which became the
dominant international preoccupation of the DCs for nearly fifty years. In
addition, the formation of the European Community (now known as the
European Union) shifted the focus of trade liberalization discussions of a
powerful bloc of states away from the GATT. Under these circumstances, the
international consensus and goodwill that drove the GATT in the immediate
postwar period could not but dissipate rapidly. Thus, in the international trade
and economic arena, the consensus and momentum that produced the United
Nations and IMF were insufficient to create the third institution in the series,
the ITO, which was to administer international trade relations." 7 Perhaps
the most powerful testimony to the dissipation in international momentum is
the fact that the ITO foundered in the U.S. Congress, even though the United
States had been its chief proponent and the international leader in building the
postwar international economic order. 171
Today, the long postwar period of economic expansion has been replaced
by lower growth rates and economic stagnation, which leave governments
with still less political leeway for exhibiting magnanimity in international trade
175. See supra text accompanying note 1.
176. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 2, at 117-19; Jackson, Recent Problems, supra note 2, at 5-6. For
relevant discussions of post-World War II international developments, see, for instance, A.W. DE PORTE,
EUROPE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS: THE ENDURING BALANCE (1979); ALFRED GROSSER, THE
WESTERN ALLIANCE: EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE 1945 (1980); GEORGE F. KENNN,
MEMOIRS: 1925-1950 (1967); KEoHANE, supra note 2, at 135-81; THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND
CONTEMPORARY EUROPE (C.S. Maier ed., 1978); SPERO, supra note 2, at 1-130; Pollard & Wells, supra
note 2.
177. See supra text accompanying note 1.
178. DE PORTE, supra note 176, at 131; JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 2, at 34;
KEOHANs, supra note 2, at 143-44; MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1138; SPERO, supra note
2, at 94-95; Jackson, Future Institutions, supra note 2, at 16-17.
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relations and diverting attention from parochial national interests. 79 The
energy currently expended by the international community in negotiating
regional and sectoral trade agreements speaks eloquently to the absence of
international consensus regarding multilateral international trade
agreement. 
80
Concurrently with the evaporation of political will and idealism among the
GATT founding states, the GATT admitted a diverse lot of new members and
grew from twenty-two founding members' to nearly one hundred parties
today. New members, many of them LDCs, introduced new concerns and
issues into the GATT membership and thereby dissipated ever more the initial
consensus and momentum of the founding GATT members.1 2 Forging
consensus and compromise among one hundred nations takes a very long time.
Furthermore, as the time required to build consensus among the GATT
membership passes, internal political parties and policies governing within the
hundred GATT member states shift.8 3 How, therefore, can one hundred
nations reach consensus if their internal policy goals regarding the GATT
negotiations shift autonomously?
In sum, the decades following the founding of the GATT witnessed two
fundamental political changes affecting the institution. First, as the Second
World War and the economic instability that preceded and accompanied it
receded from the political consciousness and were replaced by new
preoccupations, the GATT lost the momentum of a unified, driving political
will. Second, dozens of states were admitted to the institution. Their
admission further diluted whatever unified will and consensus remained among
the founders and introduced new agendas, none of which achieved the same
level of dominance and momentum as those that had animated the founders.
3. Multilateralism in the GATS
The political weaknesses in the process that produced the GATT have
colored the GATS as well. The GATS manifests the debilitating compromises
required to achieve so-called agreement on services trade among groups as
diverse as the GATT membership or GNS. Some significant services sectors,
such as aviation services, are altogether excluded from its scope.' 4 Other
major sectors such as financial services, audiovisual services, shipping, and
telecommunications are covered only by an agreement to continue negotiations
179. MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1141; SPERO, supra note 2, at 117-18.
180. See infra part IV.A.
181. BERNT & WvEss, supra note 2, at 104.
182. Brand, supra note 2, at 120-21; Davey, supra note 2, at 62; Klaiman, supra note 2, at 675
n.135; Nayyar, supra note 23, at 38 ("[TIhe GATT framework.., was developed in the context of a
specific historical conjuncture largely by countries at similar levels of industrialization and development,
while the less developed countries were subsequently provided for through exceptions to the rules.").
183. See Jackson, Recent Problems, supra note 2, at 1-2.
184. Dodwell, supra note 8.
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because GNS participants were unable to achieve substantive agreement. 85
The political compromises required to reach a semblance of agreement on
services by the conclusion of the Uruguay Round also undercut the obligations
of general application undertaken by the parties to the GATS. Some
obligations undertaken by GATS members are phrased in permissive, not
mandatory, terms. 186 Other obligations, such as those concerning
harmonization of national regulatory schemes, market access, and national
treatment, are qualified by exceptions within the individual country sched-
ules." 7 Still other obligations concerning such fundamental issues as the
status of developing countries, standards and licensing, competition policy,
emergency safeguard measures, government procurement, and subsidies, are
unresolved pending future negotiations.188
Any attempt to approach as contentious an issue as services trade
liberalization on the same multilateral basis adopted by the GATT and the
GNS in drafting the GATS cannot yield meaningful results within a reasonable
time frame. An approach as all-inclusively multilateral as that of the GATT
could only succeed in the services trade context if political developments were
again to elevate one state or a small group of states to the same degree of
world dominance enjoyed by the western Allies immediately after the end of
World War II.
In summary, the approach to trade liberalization taken in the GATT and
GATS rests upon four fundamental principles: MFN treatment, national
treatment, institutionalized dispute resolution, and multilateralism. While this
approach represents a highly ambitious, laudable effort, it requires substantial
modification to advance services trade liberalization. Because of economic
differences between services and goods (which are covered), and because of
inherent flaws in the GATT approach, it is best to pursue services trade
liberalization outside the GATT framework.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION
Services trade liberalization agreements should be grounded in five
elements. Agreements should initially be negotiated among comparatively
small groups of states united by their pursuit of defined goals; incorporate
dispute resolution mechanisms along an adjudicatory model; incorporate
multiple tiers of membership, with objective regulatory-reciprocal trade
liberalization obligations defining each tier; be limited to related industrial
185. Id. See, e.g., Gillian Tett, Financial Services Demand, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1994, at 4
(disagreement between the United States and EU over financial services).
186. See, e.g., GATS, supra note 8, art. VII(I) (recognizing certain national regulatory schemes by
other member states).
187. See, e.g., id. arts. VI, XVI, XVII. See also supra text accompanying note 94 for an example
of the extent to which qualifications by member states may undercut a GATS obligation.
188. See, e.g., GATS supra note 8, arts. IV, VI(4), IX, X, XIII, XV.
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sectors; and incorporate a competition policy. These five elements both reflect
the substantive criticisms reviewed earlier and incorporate procedural
modifications to the operational political process by which trade agreements
are negotiated.
The approach proposed here aims to define trade liberalization goals that
may be attained reasonably and expeditiously while at the same time retaining
incentives for further trade liberalization. An ambitious approach modeled on
the GATT, seeking to apply one comprehensive treaty with rules that
simultaneously govern most nations and industries, will not yield optimum
results within a reasonable time frame. Instead, this article suggests that
developing realistic, attainable trade liberalization goals involves fine
definition of the participating states, of the rules to which the states agree, and
of the industrial sectors covered to ensure that participating states are
sufficiently united by common interests to allow effective and expeditious
agreement.
I do not suggest abandoning the GATT-GNS approach in proposing an
alternative. Instead, these discussions should be supported as they wind their
way to further liberalization and reform in the coming decades in future
rounds of negotiations. However, more modest but tangible gains need not be
deferred in the meantime, but may be attained now via the proposed approach
by states and industries that are more readily willing to liberalize services
trade.
A. Targeted Multilateralism
Services trade agreements should be negotiated bilaterally or among small
groups of states that share a common objective.' 89 Once negotiated, such
treaties should remain open for membership to other willing participants on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis.'90 Several considerations drive this proposal.
The political development of the GATT and GNS demonstrates that a
group of states not united by a common goal cannot negotiate productively.
Therefore, the United States and other states seeking to liberalize services
trade should not include in their negotiations states fundamentally averse to
liberalization so that negotiations do not become unproductive and agreements
are not reduced to the lowest common denominator.' 9'
189. See, e.g., MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1149; Kasper, supra note 67, at 102-03
(proposing "targeted multilateral agreement" in aviation services); see also Shane, supra note 55, at 2,
5 (arguing for multilateral aviation services trade liberation negotiations among United States and EU
states).
190. Of course, such treaties should contain provisions for amendment.
191. Indeed, United States Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter had argued that the United States
could convene services trade liberalization negotiations outside the GATT framework if LDCs persisted
in obstructing progress within the GATT. Berg, supra note 6, at 13-14; see also Kasper, supra note 67,
at 103; MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1149 (proposing negotiation of free trade area
including at least EU, North America, and Japan and thereby contemplating non-inclusion of much of rest
of world).
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The success of treaties limited to like-minded states underscores the value
of targeted multilateralism. For example, because the EU states share common
economic and security goals, they have been able to agree on an organic
treaty that includes broad rights of free movement of goods 9 2 and
workers, 93 rights of establishment,194 and rights to provide services;19
competition law;196 and institutions with autonomous legal personality to
enforce these rules. 97 Such liberalization steps are unthinkable within the
GATT context. Had they been forced to include eighty other states in their
negotiations, many of which bitterly oppose such liberalization, the EU states
would have been unable to realize gains from such liberal trade within the EU
market.
The U.S.-Canada-Free Trade Agreement'98 presents another example
of the results that targeted multilateralism can achieve. For many traded
services, this agreement grants rights of national treatment, 99 establishment,
and liberalized access to local distribution systems;2' liberalizes government
procurement of services; 201  relaxes investment rules, 202  NTBs, 203
immigration rules ,2' and subsidies; 25 and protects intellectual property
rights.2  The United States-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement,2 7 which
specifically applies to services,20 8 likewise illustrates the benefits of limiting
negotiations to willing participants. 2' These three treaties demonstrate that
192. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AS AMENDED BY SUBSEQUENT
TREATIES [EEC TREATY], arts. 9, 30, 34, 95.
193. Id. arts. 48-51.
194. Id. arts. 52-54.
195. Id. arts. 57, 59.
196. Id. arts. 85, 86.
197. The primary EU institutions are the Commission of the European Communities, the Council
of Ministers, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament. See id. arts. 137, 145, 155,
164.
198. Free-TradeAgreement, Dec. 23, 1987, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281. This treaty was incorporated
into U.S. domestic law by the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851, as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-207, § I(b), as amended by Pub.
L. No. 101-382, Title I, §§ 103(b), 134(b) (codified as a Note to 19 U.S.C.A. § 2112 (1993)) [hereinafter
US-CFTAIA].
199. Id. § 304(b)(1)(B); see McCulloch, supra note 21, at 344.
200. US-CFTAIA, supra note 198, § 304(b)(1)(C); see McCulloch, supra note 21, at 344.
201. US-CFTAIA, supra note 198, § 304(a)(1)(E), (b)(1)(D).
202. Id. § 304(a)(1)(B), (b)(2)(A); see McCulloch, supra note 21, at 344.
203. US-CFTAIA, supra note 198, § 304(b)(1)(A).
204. Id. § 307; McCulloch, supra note 21, at 344.
205. US-CFTAIA, supra note 198, § 304(b)(1)(A).
206. Id. § 304(a)(1)(C), (b)(3).
207. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., 24 I.L.M.
653 [hereinafter Israel Agreement]. This treaty is implemented in U.S. domestic law by the United
States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-47 (codified as a Note to 19
U.S.C.A. § 2112 (1993)) [hereinafter US-IFTAIA].
208. Israel Agreement, supra note 207, art. 16.
209. The treaty is the first trade pact ever negotiated that pertains to trade in a complete range of
services, including transportation, travel, tourism, communications, banking, insurance, construction
engineering, accounting, education, law, management consulting, computer services, and advertising.
Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 22. If the U.S. and Israel had waited for progress among the GATT
membership generally, contemplation of such comprehensive trade liberalization would have eluded them
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more concrete and rapid steps to liberalize services trade may be achieved
when negotiations include only a targeted group of states. The split between
GATT members unwilling to discuss services and the GNS illustrates that
even GATT members recognize the need to choose participants to services
trade liberalization discussions.
Efforts to bypass the GATT further suggest general international
impatience with the extreme multilateralism of the GATT. Prominent
examples of such efforts include the approximately two hundred side
agreements among groups of GATT members," 0 circumvention of GATT
procedures via bilateral and regional treaties over the past ten years,2 ' such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),212 the Southern
Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), t3 the European Economic Area
(EEA),214 the Central American Common Market, 2 5 and the proposed
Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA).
216
Services trade agreements must not become tools of exclusion that aid in
the formation of hostile trading blocs.217 Membership should remain open
to all states that eliminate comparable trade restrictions and meet objective
standards of regulatory reciprocity.218 The benefits of trade liberalization
among treaty members" 9 would then induce nonmember states to relax trade
for decades to come.
210. MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1143.
211. Id. para. 1142.
212. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. Sand 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Interestingly enough, Taiwan has expressed an interest in joining NAFTA.
Calling Poland and Taiwan, EcoNOMIsT, Mar. 13, 1993, at 19 [hereinafter Calling Poland].
213. Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., 30 I.L,M.
1041. Parties to the treaty agreed to eliminate all tariffs within the common market and to establish a
common external tariff by 1994. Id. art. 1; see also Rebecca D. Dandeker, The Rose Garden Agreement:
Is MERCOSUR the Next Step to a Hemispheric Free Trade Zone?, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 157, 159
(1992). A Brazilian official characterized MERCOSUR as a priority for trade relations, to be settled before
its members consider applying for membership in NAFTA. Minister Silvio Amaral, Embassy of Brazil,
Washington, D.C., Remarks at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Conference on the
Future of Economic Integration in the Americas, Mar. 24, 1993. If its members view MERCOSUR to be
a priority trade issue to be resolved prior to their consideration of membership in NAFTA, one may only
wonder where on their agenda multilateral GATT efforts rank.
214. Agreement on the European Economic Area, May 2, 1992, LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Bdiel File.
The EEA consists of the twelve EU nations plus Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. David
Gardner, EEA Links 17 Nations in World's Largest Free Trade Zone, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1994, at 1.
215. The Central American Common Market, encompassing Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, was established in 1960 with the General Treaty on Central American
Economic Integration. Edward Orlebar, Vision of Unity for Embattled CentralAmerica, FIN. TIMEs, Nov.
3, 1993, at 8.
216. AFTA is expected to encompass Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Brunei, which together count 320 million inhabitants and thus could become as significant a regional
grouping as are the EU and NAFTA signatories. Kieran Cooke et al., Asean Free Trade Zone Sputters
into Action, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 1993, at 3. Mexico is also currently negotiating free trade agreements
with Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, and Costa Rica. Stephen Fidler & Damian Fraser, Mexico Plans S.
American Trade Pact, FiN. TIMEs, Oct. 13, 1993, at 4.
217. See, e.g., Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 134; see also MoNoPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para.
1150.
218. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
219. See supra part III.A.
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restrictions in order join. Leaving services trade treaties open for membership
by all comers on objective terms allows smaller states with little clout in
political negotiations equal access to trade liberalization.
The operation of regional agreements has demonstrated that definition of
treaty participants on a regional basis need not cause the formation of hostile
trading blocs that may, on balance, restrict world trade. Instead, these
agreements may advance trade liberalization as states that are not participants
in a successful regional grouping seek membership in that group and thereby
extend the benefits of trade liberalization over a wider area. For example, the
U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement has grown to include Mexico and has
thereby become NAFTA; states as disparate as Taiwan and Chile now appear
to be future candidates for inclusion in NAFTAY0 The European
Community has also grown to include multiple new members and has recently
become the European Union; other states, such as members of the former
Soviet-bloc and non-EU members of the EEA, are standing by, ready to join
in the future."'
Initially narrow regional trade liberalization efforts can thus serve as a
catalyst, spreading trade liberalization over wider areas. Again, I aim to
define participants in trade liberalization discussions on the basis of regional,
or other, common interests to achieve relatively rapid, incremental,
progressive liberalization wherever it is possible.
B. Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Services trade agreements should include access to a dispute resolution
mechanism based on an adjudicatory model. 2 The elements of this proposal
are designed to address the difficulties associated with the GATT and GNS
that were identified earlier.' First, individual complainants should have the
right to bring private actions to enforce treaty rules .' This would eliminate
the delay and uncertainty of the GATT-based approach, which forces
individual complainants to lobby their national governments to champion an
issue before foreign governments. This would also benefit true multinational
service providers that have significant investments within multiple states but
220. See Calling Poland, supra note 212, at 19. See also John Barnam & Angus Foster, Teething
Troubles Nag at Mercosur Market, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1994, at 6 (noting possible Chilean interest in
joining NAFrA).
221. See Lionel Barber, East Europe Calls EC's Bluff over Free Trade, FIN. TwMEs, April 16, 1993,
at 6 (noting interest of Eastern European states in joining EU).
222. MONOPOLKOMMI$SION, supra note 2, paras. 1140, 1144, 1146; Berg, supra note 6, at 12;
Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra note 32, para. 12; Maffucci, supra note 11, at 405-08; Nicolaides, supra note
6, at 133; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 25; see also text accompanying supra note 134 (regarding
disadvantages of consensus-oriented dispute resolution model).
223. See supra part III.D.
224. This is proposed elsewhere as well. See, e.g., MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1144.
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no clear home-country government to defend them.'
In addition, a private right of action would address the infrequent
application of the GATT dispute resolution mechanism. When the national
courts of parties to a treaty apply national laws instead of treaty rules in
situations of potentially overlapping jurisdiction, the treaty loses relevance and
credibility. The GATT mechanism represents an extreme situation in that it
has little relevance to the vast majority of mundane trade disputes. A private
right of action would increase the number of cases handled by the treaty
mechanism because individual complainants would no longer need to depend
upon the limited resources of a relatively small number of government
officials to serve as advocates in hundreds of annual trade disputes.
Second, parties to a services treaty should have an absolute right to
initiate the formal dispute resolution process. This would eliminate the delay
and uncertainty inherent in negotiations under the GATT, where a grievant
must negotiate sufficient support within the GATT Council to obtain
appointment of a panel. 6
Third, compliance with the decisions of the mechanism should be
mandatory and supported by enforcement measures. 7 Parties found to be
in violation of treaty rules should not be able to frustrate the process by
refusing to abide by decisions. Instead, sanctions, most likely in the form of
withdrawal of significant concessions by other parties, should be available and
actually used to compel compliance.
Fourth, the decisions rendered by the mechanism should establish a
system of precedent binding on parties to the dispute resolution process. 2 8
This would decrease uncertainty and risk in international services transactions,
which tend to impede trade.
Fifth, to avoid national biases, dispute resolution panels should be
multinational. The mechanism should follow the model of binational
adjudicatory panels within the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement229 and
international judicial panels within the EU context.
If states negotiate services trade agreements on a targeted multilateral
basis and, as proposed below, on a sectoral basis,'O numerous individual
treaties may result. Establishing numerous binational adjudicatory panels for
225. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 2, at 136-38 (presenting examples of such multinational services
providers).
226. See Davey, supra note 2, at 91-92.
227. See, e.g., MONOPOLKOMMISSION,supra note 2, para. 1144; Davey, supra note 2, at 90-91. But
see Klaiman, supra note 2, at 677-80. Klaiman's concerns do not apply here as this proposal does not
advocate an all-encompassing multilateral approach modeled on the GATT as does Klalman.
228. See, e.g., Davey, supra note 2, at 91 (referring to utility of more developed "corpus of GATT
law"); Klaiman, supra note 2, at 684.
229. See supra note 143; see also Tycho H.E. Stahl, Problems with the United States Anti-Dtunping
Law: The Case for Reform of the Constructed Value Methodology, 11 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 1, 24
(1993) (noting Canadian insistence upon binational appellate panels to avoid national bias).
230. See infra part IV.D.
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each sector or tier2' could be very costly. It may thus be beneficial for
trade agreements to refer trade disputes to a multinational adjudicatory organ,
perhaps to a standing "Superpanel"" 2 or even to the International Court of
Justice.
Sixth, in consonance with the proposal for a sectoral approach to services
trade liberalization, effective dispute resolution mechanisms under existing
international agreements should be retained. 3
Finally, the multi-tiered approach proposed below may be crucial to the
success of the proposed type of adjudicatory dispute resolution system. Given
the disagreement over the use of an adjudicatory model to address
international trade disputes, z 4 such a system may need to be reserved to
members of a higher treaty tier; however, I do not advocate this, as an
effective dispute resolution mechanism is of fundamental importance.
C. Multiple Tiers of Reciprocal Liberalization Obligations
Services trade agreements should incorporate multiple tiers of
membership, with each tier characterized by objective, regulatory-reciprocal
trade liberalization obligations. Regulatory reciprocity involves agreement to
harmonize regulatory schemes, regardless of the degree of liberalization that
each participant must undertake to reach the agreed level of regulation. Thus,
regulatory reciprocity would require greater liberalization by restrictive states.
In contrast, negotiating reciprocity involves the exchange of economically
equivalent concessions, but will not necessarily yield the same objective level
of liberalization among treaty members. 5 Substantive legal rules designed
to attain regulatory, rather than negotiational, reciprocity would include a
conditional MFN obligation as well as a national treatment obligation that
addresses NTBs to services trade on a sectoral basis.
1. Multiple Tiers of Membership
Services trade agreements should maintain multiple tiers of membership,
with each tier characterized by objective regulatory-reciprocal trade
liberalization obligations. 6 Such a scheme would encourage participation
231. See infra part V.C.
232. Davey, supra note 2, at 103-05.
233. See, e.g., Comlish Letter, supra note 63 (commercial aviation services); Simpkins Letter, supra
note 63 (commercial maritime, trucking, and aviation services); Dean Letter, supra note 63, at 2
(commercial aviation services).
234. See supra text accompanying note 134 (noting disadvantages of consensus-oriented dispute
resolution models).
235. Nicolaides, supra note 6 , at 128-30.
236. The proposal for multiple tiers of membership to trade agreements is most likely attributable
to Professor John H. Jackson. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 95-96,
84-87 (1990). Others have advocated the multi-tiered approach as well. E.g., Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra
note 32, at 105; see also Davey, supra note 2, at 106-07 (reviewing and rejecting repeated proposals for
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in trade liberalization while at the same time setting attainable goals and
retaining incentives for further liberalization. The case of aviation services
may illustrate this structure. The Chicago Convention 7 defined six
"freedoms" of the air." Restrictions on the exercise of these freedoms by
foreign air carriers present NTBs to aviation services trade. Such barriers are
common; the fifth and sixth freedoms in particular are rarely granted by
national governments. 239 In a multiple-tier, sectoral treaty on aviation
services, for example, the first tier could include those states willing to relax
restrictions only on the first four freedoms of the air. The next tier could
include those willing to grant the first five freedoms, while the third could
include those willing to grant all six.24
This approach presents several advantages. First, it would allow at least
partial liberalization of aviation services trade over more markets than would
be possible were the treaty to have only one tier granting all six freedoms.
Those states willing to grant and receive all six freedoms, however, would not
need to settle for a lower degree of liberalization just to include a larger group
of states within the treaty. Second, it presents incentives for further
liberalization: if the additional grant of the sixth freedom upon accession to
the third tier appears advantageous, lower-tier states may join the higher tier
and liberalize further. Third, objective criteria, not negotiational prowess,
determine membership in the treaty and its tiers. Either foreign carriers are
allowed to provide domestic service, or they are not: this could be a test for
membership in the third tier. Fourth, emphasis of regulatory over negotiating
reciprocity allows even states with no further negotiating concessions to offer
opportunities for further market access.2 4 Finally, use of objective
membership criteria addresses free-rider problems242 by facilitating use of
the conditional MFN obligation as discussed below.
This simplified illustration referred to NTBs specific to the aviation
two tiers of dispute resolution obligations); Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 135 (discussing Jackson's
proposal).
237. This convention, held in Chicago in 1944, established the International Civil Aviation
Organization to set safety and technical standards and to aid the development of international civil aviation
after WWII. WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 12.
238. These freedoms are the freedoms (1) to fly across another country without landing; (2) to land
abroad for technical reasons such as refueling; (3) to offload passengers in a foreign country taken on in
the home country; (4) to take on traffic in a foreign country for offloading in the home country; (5) to
carry passengers between two or more specified countries outside the home country; and (6) to fly
passengers internally on domestic trips entirely within a country outside the home country (known as
cabotage). Secretariat of the International Civil Aviation Organization, Multilateral Agreements which
Affect the Regulation of International Air Transport 2 (background memorandum provided to participants
in the World-Wide Air Transport Colloquium, Montreal, Apr. 6-10, 1992); see also WEISMAN, supra note
21, at 13-14; Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra note 32, at 104.
239. WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 13-14.
240. Members of the third tier would grant first- and second-tier members only the first four and
first five freedoms, respectively. Third tier members, however, would grant one another all six freedoms
of the air.
241. See Shane, supra note 55, at 3.
242. See supra part III.B.
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services sector. Other factors that could be relevant to defining tiers within
services trade liberalization agreements include a willingness to relax
immigration and investment rules, the multiple regulatory schemes that are
very specific to particular services industries,243 and willingness to accede
to a particular dispute resolution mechanism. The system of tiers and
application of objective criteria transforms the MFN obligation into a
conditional one.
2. Conditional MFN
Conditional MFN, as proposed here, means that only states willing to
meet objective criteria of regulatory reciprocity may receive MFN treatment
and membership in a treaty or in one of its higher tiers. 2' States in lower
tiers receive MFN treatment only regarding those objective standards to which
they accede.24 Several considerations drive this proposal.
First, conditional MFN as proposed here avoids the free-riding problems
inherent in the unconditional MFN obligation of the GATT-based
approach.2" States receive MFN treatment conditioned upon their
willingness to meet certain objective criteria of liberalization from services
trade barriers. Because conditional MFN does not require a state to treat all
its trading partners equally whether or not the others grant regulatory
reciprocity, free-riding becomes impossible.
Second, the elimination of free-rider effects removes perverse incentives
that impede liberalization agreements and provides affirmative incentives to
liberalize. Indeed, states like the United States that aim to eliminate services
trade impediments may then use the grant of domestic market access rights as
a tool for prying open foreign markets.
3. National Treatment and NTBs
The national treatment obligation, as was argued earlier, is essential to
services trade liberalization.247 It is intended to eliminate discriminatory
national regulations that exclude foreign services providers while allowing
governments to retain regulatory control over particularly sensitive services
sectors. 2" The GATT-based approach does not carry national treatment far
enough to address those NTBs that particularly inhibit services trade.
243. See, e.g., supra note 87.
244. In GATT parlance, what is proposed here is known as "code conditionality." JACKSON, WORLD
TRADING, supra note 2, at 137; Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 134.
245. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 33, at 30, 49 (discussing conditional MFN relevant to
telecommunications and computer-based services trade resulting from divergent levels of intra- and
international trade liberalization); Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 134; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 24.
246. See supra part III.B.
247. See supra part III.C.
248. See supra part II.C.
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National regulatory schemes are rife with NTBs that particularly impede
services trade. National regulations that force foreign services providers to
mimic domestic firms may unreasonably exclude foreigners. 249 Rampant
restrictions on immigration, foreign investment, and foreign establishment are
particularly noxious. As noted, provision of services generally requires contact
between producers and consumers," 0 which means that individuals and
productive assets must generally be able to cross national borders for services
trade to take place. Because NTBs interfere with such contact and hence
impede trade, they should be addressed by services trade agreements.-"
Other NTBs that interfere with services (and goods) trade include foreign
exchange controls, government procurement policies, industry-specific
national regulatory regimes, subsidies to domestic producers, limits on
repatriation of profits, restrictions on foreign ownership, restrictions on
importation of foreign equipment, licensing and certification requirements,
absence of uniform international standards, state-sanctioned monopolies,
inadequate protection of intellectual property, 2 restrictions on establishment
by foreign firms,'sa and trade-related investment measures (TRIMs). 4
Such restrictions must be addressed by any regime seeking to liberalize
services trade.
Three elements of the proposed approach are calculated to simplify
negotiations to eliminate the effects of NTBs on services: treaties should
include targeted groups of states, maintain multiple tiers of membership, and
be negotiated on a sectoral basis. States so averse to removing NTBs that they
would frustrate negotiations would not participate.5 States willing to relax
249. See, e.g., supra note 87 (providing an example concerning the regulation of investment
advisers).
250. See supra part II.B.
251. Maffiacci, supra note 11, at 402-03; Rivers et al., supra note 6, at 23-29.
252. JACKSON, WORLD TRADiNG, supra note 2, at 130-31; OECD, supra note 33, at 23-29; SPERO,
supra note 2, at 101; Benz, supra note 11, at 99-107; Berg, supra note 6, at 8-9; Gibbs & Mashayekhi,
supra note 32, at 85-86, 103; Gold, supra note 6, at 294-97; Jackson, Future Institutions, supra note 2,
at 24-5; Lee, supra note 46, at 117-18; Maffuacci, supra note 11, at 384-87; Markusen, supra note 26, at
95; Keith E. Maskus, Normative Concerns in the International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights,
13 WORLD ECON. 387 (1990); McCulloch, supra note 21, at 341; Nayyar, supra note 23, at 42-43; Rivers
et al., supra note 6, at 26; Whitford, supra note 6, at 130-31.
253. An OECD study concludes that
[a telecommunications] firm ... may consider that it needs establishment in order to offer a
service on a competitive basis, to provide support services or because of differences in
national business practices, language and cultural differences. Establishment of foreign service
firms should be allowed for effective market access. The choice of the preferred means of
providing the service should remain as far as possible with the firm.
OECD, supra note 33, at 23; see also Landry Letter, supra note 63; Shane, supra note 55, at 7-8 (foreign
ownership and investment restrictions on U.S. airline industry).
254. David Greenaway, Trade Related Investment Measures: Political Economy Aspects and Issues
for GAIT, 13 WORLD ECoN. 367 (1990).
255. Some states are so opposed to the elimination of NTBs that it is pointless to include them in
such liberalization negotiations, as is illustrated by an argument by an Indian government official:
The inappropriateness of [including a certain liberalization obligation in the GATS] .... was
first pointed out by us.... We have argued that such equivalent treatment for foreign enter-
prises amounts to a guarantee of equal opportunity to foreign nationals and foreign enterprises
by the national government, which has no basis in any other field of economic endeavor. Does
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some but not all NTBs could be members of a lower tier within the
agreement. With these proposed modifications, the delays and often fruitless
negotiations that have characterized the GATT may be avoided. 6
D. Sectoral Approach
Negotiations on a sectoral basis would allow the parties to focus on the
details of diverse and idiosyncratic national regulatory schemes that impede
services trade. 7 Individual agreements should be specific to one or several
interrelated regulatory schemes. In practice, this would mean that agreements
on market access by professionals, financial institutions, airlines, and
telecommunications firms would be negotiated separately. At least several
U.S. services industries vehemently support this approachY
Several concerns drive this proposal. First, a sectoral approach is required
to resolve the technical, idiosyncratic, and usually sector-specific, regulatory
NTBs that restrict trade within the diverse spectrum of services industries. 9
A great weakness of the GATT-based approach of the GNS lies in its attempt
to articulate rules to govern multiple industries and states simultaneously.26
Broad rules of general application are not sufficient to resolve technical,
idiosyncratic regulatory NTBs.
Technical SEC rules restricting U.S. share distributions by foreign
investment funds,26' for instance, have no relation to restrictions upon
foreign airlines imposed by landing slot allocation schemes262 other than that
both impede trade in their respective industries. It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to construct a broad, general rule of national treatment or market
access that would eliminate both of these NTBs at once. Instead, the myriad
of such regulatory rules that apply to industries in modern economies must be
addressed individually if such NTBs are to be eliminated.263
any government permit equality of opportunity to foreigners? It is obvious that what may be
appropriate in the OECD context may not be appropriate in the multilateral context.
Randhawa, supra note 30, at 169-70.
256. See supra part III.E.2.
257. See, e.g., Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra note 32, at 104 ("Given the heterogeneity of services,
concrete solutions are probably most feasible in self-contained, individual service sectors.").
258. Comlish Letter, supra note 63 (commercial aviation); Landry Letter, supra note 63 (commercial
aviation); Shane, supra note 55; Simpkins Letter, supra note 63 (maritime, trucking, and commercial
aviation industries).
259. SPERO, supra note 2, at 102; Benz, supra note 11, at 96-97. Others have taken a contrary
position. See, e.g., Mafflicci, supra note 11, at 402.
260. This is illustrated by the inability of the GNS to resolve barriers to services trade in aviation,
financial, audiovisual, shipping, and telecommunications services sectors. While GNS participants agreed
on the abstract, general principles of the GATS, they could not resolve differences over the minutiae of
national regulatory schemes that actually impede international trade in these services.
261. See supra note 87.
262. Shane, supra note 55, at 6-7.
263. A broad rule of national treatment will not by itself grant market access so long as the
underlying, industry-specific regulations restricting market access are not eliminated. National treatment
"fails to deal effectively with the problem of barriers to entry and restrictive domestic regulations imposed
by illiberal countries." Kasper, supra note 67, at 101-02.
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Specialized bodies of regulation in different services sectors are enforced
and administered by separate, specialized agencies within each national
government. 264 Detailed and specialized expertise, which is difficult to attain
through a multi-sectoral approach, is therefore required to resolve the
specialized NTBs and regulations relevant to each service sector. Negotiations
that simultaneously review tens of thousands of unrelated industry-specific
NTBs on a country-by-country basis would likely become protracted, or
would be so cursory as not to resolve each idiosyncratic NTB. Either situation
would defeat the aim of liberalizing services trade. It is precisely because of
this required degree of detailed expertise that the Division of Investment
Management of the SEC, for example, has proposed that trade liberalization
negotiations regarding the investment company industry take place between
the relevant national regulatory agencies.265
Second, focusing negotiations on a sectoral basis further helps to define
trade liberalization goals that are reasonably and expeditiously attainable. For
instance, attempts to eliminate immigration restrictions for all industries at
once will in all likelihood founder as the United States and other DCs continue
to exclude unskilled immigrants seeking higher wages. Negotiations on a
sectoral basis, however, may yield results because DCs are much more
willing to admit highly skilled professionals. I do not argue that such
limitations represent the idealistic, optimum goal. Rather, given the
demonstrated impossibility of immediate and complete liberalization, I aim to
achieve incremental, reciprocal liberalization wherever it is possible.
Third, when negotiations are not concentrated on a sectoral basis, the lack
of progress in restrictive industries could hold back liberalization in other
industries.266 It does not make sense, for instance, to hold the elimination
of restrictions on aviation services trade on the New York-Paris route hostage
264. SPERO, supra note 2, at 102.
265. The Division proposes that foreign investment companies could be exempted from requirements
of the U.S. Investment Company Act that would likely exclude them from the U.S. market if the
foreign law under which a fund operates ... servels] the same purposes as the protections
under provisions of the Investment Company Act from which the [foreign] fund requests
exemption....
The Division anticipates that it will be difficult to make detailed findings about the
adequacy of foreign law, particularly if there exists a gap between the law as written and as
actually practiced. To address this concern, the Division's proposal would require the...
[SEC] to enter into bilateral regulatory memoranda of understanding with the securities
authorities in countries with regulatory regimes providing the same type and quality of investor
protection as provided by the Investment Company Act. The memorandum would set forth
representations about the nature and extent of foreign regulation....
In addition, the memoranda would create a framework for regulatory cooperation and
mutual recognition of investment company regulatory practices. They would establish the basis
not only for exempting a foreign investment company from regulation under the Investment
Company Act, but also for allowing United States funds to satisfy foreign regulatory
requirements to the degree necessary to provide them complementary access into foreign
countries.
DivsION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, supra note 87, 206-07 (footnote omitted); see also supra note
87.
266. Kasper, supra note 67, at 100.
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to the resolution of market opening discussions regarding the Brazilian and
Indian insurance industries.267
Fourth, sectoral negotiations avoid quantification difficulties inherent in
services trade negotiations.26 If, for instance, the United States were to
permit EU telecommunications operators access to U.S. markets in return for
a grant of "sixth freedom" rights for U.S. airlines in the EU, it would be
difficult to determine whether this was an exchange of equivalent concessions.
My approach eliminates this difficulty by limiting negotiations to regulatory-
reciprocal concessions within the same or related industries.
Fifth, sectoral negotiations avoid the fundamental lack of logic to the
cross-sectoral horse-trading practiced in the GATT.269 Cross-sectoral
concessions are not regulatory-reciprocal. In the example involving an
exchange of airline for telecommunications market access rights, U.S. airlines
would gain at the expense of U.S. telecommunications companies and EU
airlines, while EU telecommunications companies would benefit at the expense
of EU airlines and U.S. telecommunications companies. Such a distribution
of gains and costs is unlikely to be the product of rational analysis, but rather
of varying degrees of lobbying and access to the political process. In addition,
access to U.S. markets by EU telecommunications companies could no longer
be used as a carrot to induce opening of EU markets to U.S.
telecommunications companies, because EU telecommunications companies
would already have received access to U.S. markets without having made any
concessions themselves. This difficulty would be eliminated if liberalization
in the telecommunications and airline industries were negotiated separately.
The success of existing sectoral agreements underscores the value of the
proposed approach. Shifting responsibility for services negotiations over all
sectors to the GNS would entail abandoning some very successful sectoral
agreements such as the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), the International Maritime Organization, and UNCTAD, among
others.27 If responsibility for services negotiations over all sectors were
shifted to the GNS, these very successful sectoral agreements would have to
be abandoned. Discarding these functioning sectoral regimes for a new multi-
lateral agreement under the GNS would be a considerable step backwards.
267. As noted previously, this Article is written from the perspective of the United States and other
First World states with well-developed services industries.
268. See supra text accompanying note 41; see also Gibbs, supra note 18, at 213-15; Nayyar, supra
note 23, at 39-40.
269. See supra text accompanying note 41; see also Gibbs, supra note 18, at 213-15; Nayyar, supra
note 23, at 39-40.
270. See Comlish Letter, supra note 63 (aviation services); Dean Letter, supra note 63 (aviation
services); Gibbs, supra note 18, at 199-204 (intellectual property, international telecommunications, and
maritime services); Landry Letter, supra note 63 (aviation services); Shane, supra note 55 (aviation
services); Simpkins Letter, supra note 63 (maritime, trucking, and commercial aviation services).
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The 163-member ITU2 ' serves as a good illustration of the value of a
sectoral approach. ITU members have addressed numerous, highly technical
NTBs specific to the telecommunications sector, such as the allocation and
assignment of radio frequencies to prevent interference,272 the definition of
technical standards,273 the allocation of geosynchronous orbital slots for
satellites,274 and interconnection problems.275 Such progress is possible
among the ITU membership, which is at least as diverse and all-inclusive as
that of the GATT because ITU negotiations are focused to include only
sectoral experts, and ITU voting procedures, unlike those of the GATT, allow
proposals to be adopted with less than unanimous consensus.276
The ITU has also been able to resolve development issues, such as the
reservation of frequencies and geosynchronous orbital positions for LDCs that
are not yet in a position to utilize them2' and the establishment of an
infrastructure development fund to benefit LDCs.278 Such development
issues proved intractable in multilateral GATT negotiations.279 In addition,
the ITU permits efforts somewhat similar to the multi-tiered approach
proposed here to resolve differences over deregulation. States willing to intro-
duce competitive telecommunications markets are free to negotiate liberal
agreements in which those unwilling to relax regulatory controls need not
participate.
280
In sum, the ITU has been able to resolve concrete, technical obstacles to
trade in telecommunications services by resorting to several elements proposed
here: effective dispute resolution not conditioned upon complete consensus;
multiple tiers of agreement characterized by regulatory reciprocity; and expert
discussion of sector-specific NTBs on a sectoral basis.
The elements of the proposed approach discussed thus far have centered
on liberalizing services trade so as to unleash the consequent efficiency and
quality gains that economic theory predicts. Consideration of the allocation
of gains from services trade is also necessary - and will suggest that
agreements for liberalization of services trade should consider issues of
competition policy.
E. Competition Policy
Individual agreements on services trade should include a competition
271. BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 147; OECD, supra note 33, at 14-15.
272. BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 148 and 153-54.
273. Id. at 148.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 150, 152.
276. Id. at 157.
277. Id. at 152-53.
278. Id. at 154.
279. See supra part 1II.E.2.
280. BERNr & WEISS, supra note 2, at 155.
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policy, 28' which the GATT does not.2 2 A competition policy would ensure
that income and efficiency gains from services trade liberalization accrue not
just to services providers but to consumers as well. Services producers should
be prevented from erecting barriers to competition in place of those that
governments relax. The competition policy should thus include prohibitions
on mergers in highly concentrated industries and on international private
agreements to fix prices, allocate markets, and protect domestic home
markets.
28 3
Two considerations drive these proposals. First, scale and scope
economies encourage international services trade, but also pose the danger of
anti-competitive developments. Second, the function of the merger control
regulation incorporated in the 1992 European Single Market project provides
an instructive example.
1. Scale and Scope Economies
Scale and scope economies characterize services as diverse as commercial
aviation, telecommunications, banking, information processing, finance, and
law (as well as many goods sectors).24 Scale economies arise out of
increased exploitation of underutilized, indivisible assets that present fixed
costs regardless of the number of consumers served. 215 Scope economies
develop as a services producer adds additional products to the spectrum of
281. See, e.g., MONoPOLKOMMISSION,supra note 2 , para. 1115; OECD, supra note 33, at33, 52-53
(arguing that competition policy is relevant when firms grow to be dominant, although national competition
policy schemes may be sufficient); Jackson, Future Institutions, supra note 2, at 24; Nicolaides, supra note
6, at 133; see also Loughlin Interview II, supra note 64 (agreeing with such proposal, so long as
competition policy does not suppress efficiency gains of trade liberalization).
282. MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1139.
283. Id. para. 1115; Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in
a Global Economy, 81 GEo. L.J. 195 (1992) (presenting legal and policy considerations relevant to
enforcement of U.S. merger law in increasingly international markets).
284. BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 6, 16 (telecommunications services); OECD, supra note 33,
at 12 (integrated services digital networks telecommunications services); WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 44,
170 (telecommunications, banking, and transport services); Kasper, supra note 67, at 94-95 (airline
services); Loughlin Interview II, supra note 64; Ryan, supra note 35, at 358-60 (banking and financial
services).
285. Scale economies are reductions in the average cost of a product resulting from an expanded
level of output. Increasing production while using a fixed stock of assets dilutes the proportion of fixed
costs allocable to each individual unit of output, thereby lowering the average cost of production. BERNT
& WEISS, supra note 2, at 418; WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 31; Pearce, supra note 21, at 125. See
generally J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, 329-42 (3d ed. 1984).
For example, in the commercial aviation sector, such indivisible assets may include aircraft, airport
facilities, reservations systems, and route authorities. An increase in the number of passengers served
decreases the average cost of serving each passenger by further diluting the fixed cost allocable to each
passenger.
Scale economies are particularly relevant to services industries, which are characterized by high
initial investment in a capital or knowledge-base, which is a fixed cost. See, e.g., BERNT & WEISS, supra
note 2, at 6, 16 (scale economies in telecommunications); OECD, supra note 33, at 12 (Integrated Services
Digital Networks telecommunications services); WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 86 (commercial aviation);
Markusen, supra note 26, at 95 (producer services); McCulloch, supra note 21, at 338-39; Nayyar, supra
note 23, at 45; Ryan, supra note 35, at 358-60 (noting some economies in banking and financial services).
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products produced.2"6 Scope economies exist principally for two reasons.
First, each additional service produced increases the overall volume of
consumers served and thereby allows increased exploitation of yet
underutilized indivisible assets.28 7 Second, concentrating some indivisible
productive assets at nodes or hubs28 allows a services producer to utilize
those assets more fully, which, in turn, also enables the services producer to
minimize its investment in productive assets.28 9
Services producers seek to lower production costs, particularly in
competitive markets. As a result, the pursuit of scale and scope economies,
which lower production costs, drives services producers to hunt for ever
larger markets through international expansion and trade. That scale and scope
economies provide an impetus for international trade is critically important.
Economic theory suggests that services trade liberalization allows efficiency
gains and concomitant welfare gains to society. 20 However, since scale and
scope economies may yield oligopolistic markets in maturing industries,29'
it is also necessary to consider the allocation of gains from trade liberalization
between consumers and producers within a society. Consequently, any attempt
to liberalize international services trade must include a competition policy if
the efficiency gains resulting from trade liberalization are to accrue to services
286. Scope economies are cost reductions from expanding the variety of services produced. Scope
economies result from the greater scale of exploitation of indivisible investments when a variety of
products are produced with the same assets. BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 418; WEISMAN, supra note
21, at 5, 31-33, 44.
In commercial aviation, the scope of products offered by an airline increases as additional
destinations are added to the airline network so that the airline network offers transportation between a
greater number of city-pair combinations. WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 128 (observing that "[a]n airline's
output... depends positively on its economies of scope and negatively on the number of airlines serving
the market."), 144, 148; Kasper, supra note 67, at 102 (noting "importance of network access and
economies of scope in air-service markets").
287. WEISMAN, supra note 21, at 36-37. Empirical research supports assertions of scope economies
for aviation services. Id. at 144, 148. Similarly, the fixed cost of a telecommunications satellite is diluted
over additional customers when it links not one city-pair but multiple cities up to its capacity. Similarly,
a law firm may further dilute fixed costs such as staff, leases, and a library by providing multiple types
of legal services, thereby expanding the number of clients that may be served using these same fixed costs.
See generally id. at 170-72.
288. A "hub" airport is "a switching point where passengers can make several alternative
connections." Id. at 20; see BERNT & WEISS, supra note 2, at 95-96 (observing hub phenomenon in
international telecommunications services).
289. For instance, the hub-and-spoke technique allows an airline to fill aircraft and the hub airport
terminal with passengers desiring connecting service through the hub city, in addition to those whose final
destination will be the hub itself. Further, the fixed investment cost of an aircraft may be diluted over addi-
tional passengers when it serves multiple destinations: instead of being idle when not needed to serve one
destination, it can earn additional revenue by then serving others. See generally WEISMAN, supra note 21,
at 22, 36-37. This source of scope economies is likewise not limited to the commercial aviation sector.
Id. at 32, 52, 170. For instance, the fixed cost of a satellite ground station may be diluted over additional
users when it collects signals from multiple points of origin for transmission through the satellite, instead
of linking merely one spoke of the network with the satellite. Similarly, attorneys specializing in different
fields may dilute fixed costs such as libraries and support staff over clients seeking many different types
of services by aggregating in a law firm.
290. See supra part III.A.
291. See generally DOUGLAS F. GREER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 118-19,
156-69 (2d ed. 1980); see also OECD, supra note 33, at 12; Loughlin Interview 1I, supra note 67.
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consumers in addition to services producers.
Services trade liberalization thus presents the danger of creating powerful
private actors that, first, will seek to reap the efficiency gains allowed by
liberalization for themselves without sharing them with services consumers
and, second, will erect barriers to trade and competition in place of those that
governments remove.292 The German Monopolkommission has even argued
that, once attained, "private market power is always directed to restricting
competition, as this is the only means by which it is sustainable." 93 Apart
from the specific dangers relating to the rise of oligopolies in services
industries, international policies advancing competition are beneficial for
essentially the same economic reasons militating in favor of elimination of
governmental restrictions upon international trade.294
Because of such considerations, the GATS encourages governments to
address private anticompetitive behavior restricting international trade.295
Unfortunately, the GATS provision is phrased in permissive, not mandatory,
terms.
2. European Merger Control Regulation
Unlike the GNS, the European Commission (Commission) recognized the
urgent relevance of competition policy to trade liberalization in its
implementation of the 1992 Single Market project. The Commission insisted
that the 1992 Single Market project include a Merger Control Regulation
(Regulation)296 because of the allocative concerns articulated above.297 The
Commission firmly rejected dirigiste statist models and intended private firms
to achieve the integration of EU markets across Europe by merging and
trading with other firms, in pursuit of the estimated ECU 200 billion in
efficiency gains expected from the establishment of the Single Market.298
Yet if the corporate mergers enabled by the elimination of intra-EU NTBs
could proceed without supervision by a competition policy of merger control,
the benefits of EU integration would accrue disproportionately to businesses
292. Gibbs & Mashayekhi, supra note 32, at 92 (noting LDC fears of "recognized restrictive
business practices" by multinational corporations "amount to serious barriers to trade"); Jackson, Future
Institutions, supra note 2, at 24; Loughlin Interview 11, supra note 64; Nayyar, supra note 23, at 44;
Nicolaides, supra note 6, at 133; see also MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1112.
293. MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 2, para. 1112 (translation by author).
294. See, e.g., Pastor, supra note 33 (arguing that competition lowered intra-US and intra-EC
telecommunications rates and would likewise lower trans-Atlantic telecommunications rates, if introduced
in that market).
295. See GATS, supra note 8, art. IX. Despite Article IX, the EC Commissioner for competition
policy, Karel Van Miert, states "'[O]ne should not even dream about a worldwide and independent
competition agency at this stage.'" Williams, supra note 10, at 7.
296. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 395).
297. See generally Tycho H.E. Stahl, Competition-Oriented Merger Control: A Tool For Unifying
the European Community, 14 INT'L MERGER L. 15 (1991).
298. See generally MONOPOLKOMMISSION, SONDERGUTACHTEN 17: KONZEPrION EINER
EUROPISCHEN FUSIONSKONTROLLE 4-5 (1989).
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and not to consumers.299 The Commission sought the Regulation in order to
prevent such a one-sided allocation of benefits ." This reasoning and the
experience of EU integration are relevant to the larger-scale project of
liberalizing international services trade.
V. CONCLUSION
The General Agreement on Trade in Services was completed and opened
for signature on December 15, 1993 as part of the GNS, which was conducted
in parallel with the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. The GATS
represents an idealistic, laudable effort to apply the GATT approach to trade
liberalization to services trade, an area of economic activity that is crucial
particularly to the United States and other DCs. Efforts to liberalize services
trade via the GATS, while worthy of support as they continue over the
coming decades, do not represent an optimum approach and ought to be
supplemented, as other avenues for pursuing services trade liberalization can
achieve more immediate and tangible results.
First, the GATT has been applied exclusively to trade in goods, which
differ from services in important respects. Production and trade in services
represent by far the dominant component of the economies of developed
countries like the United States. Services are intangible processes that are
often traded via interaction between producers and consumers in cross-border
movements of capital assets or personnel. Not surprisingly, then, services and
services trade are also difficult to quantify and to measure. Unlike most
goods, services are subject to extensive government regulation under highly
technical, detailed, idiosyncratic and sector-specific regulatory regimes
administered by specialized government agencies.
Second, the approach of the GATT, and consequently also that of the
GATS, is flawed. The general philosophy behind the GATT and the GATS,
that trade liberalization generally benefits the nations of the world, is sound,
so long as one considers allocational issues, both between more and less
developed states and between producers and consumers. The legal rules by
which the GATT-based approach seeks to implement its philosophy of trade
liberalization, however, also invite criticism.
The MFN obligation of the GATT-based approach creates disincentives
to liberalization because of its unconditional nature. The national treatment
rule does not by itself remedy the highly technical, detailed, idiosyncratic and
sector-specific regulatory regimes that impede trade in services sectors. The
dispute resolution mechanism of the GATT, which served as the model for the
corresponding mechanism incorporated in the GATS, is beset by difficulties:
its orientation towards international consensus reduces its effectiveness in
299. Id.
300. See generally Stahl, supra note 297.
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resolving trade disputes, and the infrequency of its application renders it
irrelevant to the majority of the myriad trade disputes that arise. Finally,
perhaps the most significant difficulty with the GATT-based approach of the
GATS is its all-inclusive multilateralism.
A comprehensive treaty with rules that simultaneously govern most
nations and most industries will not yield optimum results within a reasonable
time frame. This Article argues that a project to liberalize trade in services
should carefully specify the participating states, the rules to which the states
agree, and the industrial sectors covered, as necessary to choose participants
united by common interests. Only then will liberalization discussions achieve
relatively rapid, incremental, progressive liberalization wherever it is possible.
Besides such a rule of targeted multilateralism, this Article proposes that
liberalization agreements include effective, adjudicatory dispute resolution
mechanisms, conditional MFN obligations, multiple tiers of membership, and
a competition policy.
This Article is founded in the hope that the industrial economies of the
developed world and, in particular, the United States, the European Union,
and Japan, are committed to services trade liberalization and not just to the
exploitation of their neighbors in pursuit of short-term goals. Given that the
grant of access to U.S. and other industrial markets is a valuable benefit,
these states are in a position to assume a leadership role in pursuing services
trade liberalization. Indeed, if this proposal proves to be successful, it may in
turn provide an impetus to reform the GATT regime governing trade in
goods.
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